

"New Worlds of Violence in the Southeast"
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Note to readers: this is cut out of a longer work, essentially a revised chapter of my dissertation (2007, University of Illinois). I've included the abstract to provide some context.

"This Country is Worth the Trouble of Going to War to Keep It":
Cultures of Violence in the American Southeast to 1740"

"This Country is Worth the Trouble of Going to War to Keep It" presents a new way of looking at the violence that marked the colonization of the American Southeast by the English, French and Spanish. It eschews older interpretations that emphasize Native savagery, and those that replaced Indian savagery with European savagery during the 1960s and 1970s. The dissertation also moves beyond the notion that English domination of the region was inevitable. The project instead places violence at the center of the narrative, and focuses on the various cultures of violence that collided with one another in the Southeast. The peoples of the Southeast interpreted and deployed violence in a variety of ways. Prolonged contact and conflict between cultures changed cultures of violence for everyone involved, and by 1740, the violence of the English trade system and the English plantation had dominated the region, establishing a pattern that would play out again and again further to the west. Native and African cultures of violence continued to exist, but they moved in circles defined almost entirely by the English.

The arrival of English men and women in the Southeast heralded a fundamental shift in the way violence was deployed in the region. As the English fanned out along the rivers of the Southeast, their violent institutions, the plantation and the Indian trading house, came to dominate the country. The English

did not view their brand of colonization as particularly violent: to them, the Spanish had cornered the market on colonial violence. Perhaps subsequent generations of Americans have excused or ignored English violence because they like to perceive their history as one of settlement and progress, rather than conquest and empire.¹

A history of violent ideas and violent practices fed into the English culture of violence that would dominate the Southeast. English ways of claiming territory, English ways of making land profitable, and English trade were not new ideas. It is not even that innovative to suggest that each of these alone could produce violence. The example of the Southeast is so powerful because English violence conquered the Southeast so quickly, and that multiple factors—which the English did not perceive as particularly violent—worked in concert to promote violence and change cultures of violence in the Southeast.

Migrations in the Southeast

The seventeenth-century Southeast was the site of several notable migrations, each of which contained the seeds of intercultural conflict. Beginning in 1670, a handful of Barbadian planters made their way to the confluence of the

¹ The notion that English colonists came as farmers and planters, French colonists came as traders, and the Spanish were bloodthirsty adventurers has had tremendous staying power in American history. If it has not already, the "Black Legend" of Spanish cruelty should be discarded in favor of a more complicated scenario: Europeans of any sort could commit colonial violence.

Ashley and Cooper Rivers, bringing with them the first of thousands of African slaves. During the 1680s, Scots under Lord Cardross migrated from Glasgow to Port Royal and established Stuart's Town. The Spanish mission system crept northward up the coast, then retreated under pressure from English and Westo raids. But the various English, Scottish and Spanish colonial projects were not painting on a blank canvas. In fact, Native people had their own long history of migration, as the communities spun off from Mississippian chiefdoms continued along their paths of coalescence. Native groups like the Westos and Savannahs moved closer to Charles Town, and played significant roles in the Indian slave trade. The Yamasees, refugees from raids themselves, moved from the interior toward the Spanish missions, and from the vicinity of the missions toward the English. Beginning in the 1680s, the Yamasees were Charles Town's staunchest Native allies. It was not until 1715 that they would become English Carolina's deadliest enemies.²

The first English people to settle in Carolina entered a world that was in the process of being remade through violence, though the first white Carolinians were probably only dimly aware of this fact. Nicholas Carteret, one of the first white settlers of Carolina, noted the coastal peoples' willingness to

² The three decades of Yamasee-English cooperation deserve intense scholarly scrutiny on their own terms; they may yet have much to offer to the broad-brushed portrait of colonial life in the Southeast.

entertain the English and invite them to settle. According to Carteret, they were greeted with cries of

Hiddy doddy Comorado Angles Westoe Skorrye
(which is as much as to say) English very
good friends Westoes are nought, they hoped
by our Arrivall to be protected from ye
Westoes.³

The warm welcome and invitation might seem at first to be a figment of the colonists' imagination. Plantation and colonization would go so much more smoothly if the neighbors were complicit in the project from the beginning. However, tracing the Westos' story through eastern North America adds weight to the colonists' claims about being invited and welcomed.⁴

³ "Mr. Carteret's Relation," in Langdon Cheves, ed., *The Shaftesbury Papers* (Charleston: Tempus Publishing for the South Carolina Historical Society, 2000; orig. 1897), 165-71. Quotation appears on 168-69.

⁴ There is a significant exception to the warm welcome Lowcountry tribes, collectively referred to as Cusabos, extended to their new neighbors. The Kussoes became the focus of some consternation on the part of Carolina's Grand Council in late 1671. They were accused of "stealing 'a great quantity of Corn'" and, more threateningly, of working with the Spanish "'to cut off the English people in this place.'" The English declared war in October. There is not much evidence to indicate how the war was prosecuted, but in 1675 the "great and the lesser Cassoe" ceded their land and relocated, though not very far. Both the Kussah ("lesser Cassoe") and Kussoe ("great ... Cassoe") peoples came to be known as "settlement Indians." The settlement Indians maintained close ties to the Carolina colony well into the eighteenth century, providing an early warning system for—and buffer against—attacks. They also joined Carolina's military expeditions against the Spanish, Tuscaroras, and Yamasees. As a symbol of the unequal relationship between the Kussoes and Carolina, the former were required to bring a single to deerskin to Charles Town each year to pay tribute. See Alan Galloway, *The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2002), 51-2; *Journals of the Grand Council* (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1907),

Westo Migration and Rehearsal for Slaving

The contours of Westo experience prior to encountering the Carolina colonists are becoming clearer. Their origins can be traced to Iroquoian peoples—specifically Erie peoples—in western Pennsylvania and New York. In the wake of increased Five Nations Iroquois attacks, one community of Eries, known as the Riquerhonnons, moved to the falls of the James River by 1656. The English at Virginia called them "Rickahockans" or "Richahecrians" and, after an initial confrontation, engaged in a profitable trade with the newcomers.⁵

Within a couple of years, the Richahecrians were undertaking long distance journeys for slaves and furs that brought them to the outskirts of Florida's missions; the Spanish called them "Chichimecos," a blanket term applied to any number of groups that lived outside of the Spanish sphere of influence. By the time they got to Virginia, the Eries had combined the mentality of the mourning war with the mindset of the market to great effect. The mourning war was a defining feature of Iroquoian life before the arrival of European people, diseases,

September/October 1671; and Gene Waddell, *Indians of the South Carolina Lowcountry, 1562-1751* (Spartanburg, S.C.: Reprint Company, 1980); and Gene Waddell, "Cusabo" in William Sturtevant, ed., *Handbook of North American Indians*, Vol. 14: Southeast (Washington, D.C.: Smithsonian Institution Press, 2004), 254-64.

⁵ For the origins of the Westos, see Eric Bowne, *The Westo Indians: Slave Traders of the Early Colonial South* (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 2005), esp. 37-53; John T. Juricek, "The Westo Indians," *Ethnohistory* 11:2 (Spring 1964), 134-173; Marvin T. Smith, *Archaeology of Aboriginal Culture Change* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1987), 131-132; and Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 41-42.

and trade goods.⁶ As disease took a toll on the native Northeast, and as native people sought European goods, mourning wars increased in size and expanded in meaning to include economic motives. The introduction of firearms only increased the devastation. The Eries were on the receiving end of Five Nations aggression in the early 1650s.⁷ When they arrived in Virginia, the Richahecrians were armed and well aware of the skills necessary to thrive in the world between the native interior and the colonial market. They came to dominate Virginia's southern trade. It follows that their Virginia experience prepared the Westos to become the premier Indian slavers of the Southeast.⁸

As elite white Virginians struggled to develop a plantation economy, they were plagued by a perennial labor shortage. To satisfy the demand for labor, wealthy planters increasingly turned toward chattel slavery. The limited and sporadic availability of African slaves in seventeenth-century North America made Native American slavery attractive. Carolina's planners envisioned it as a plantation colony from the outset, and its chronic labor shortage was much more severe than

⁶ Daniel Richter, *The Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 32-38; and Richter, "War and Culture: The Iroquois Experience," *William and Mary Quarterly*, 3rd Ser., 40:4 (October 1983), 528-559.

⁷ Richter, *Ordeal of the Longhouse*, 62; Smith, *Archaeology*, 132; and Bowne, *Westo Indians*, 39-41 and 49-52. Most of these accounts can be traced to Jesuit relations of life in New France.

⁸ See Gallyay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 41-43; Bowne, *The Westo Indians*, 72-75; and John Worth, *The Struggle for the Georgia Coast: An Eighteenth-Century Spanish Retrospective on Guale and Mocama*, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History, no. 75 (New York: American Museum of Natural History, 1995), 17.

Virginia's.⁹ When white planters spread out from Charles Town in the 1670s, they came into contact and conflict with the Westos, who were already engaged in the Indian slave trade and were eager to gain greater access to English goods. Authorities in Carolina recognized the importance of maintaining cordial relations with the Westos, and the Westos recognized the threat and opportunity of the new English arrivals.

In October 1674, Dr. Henry Woodward embarked on what he called his *Westoe Voiage*; his narrative offers a rare glimpse into Westo involvement in the slave trade. Woodward did not understand the Westos' language, but he divined from a series of drawings—"of a bever, a man, on horseback and guns"—that the Westos desired to open some sort of "comerse."¹⁰ Woodward was treated well, and came to understand certain things about the Westos. They traded "drest deare skins furr and young Indian Slaves" for "arms, ammunition [and] trading cloath ... from the northward [Virginia]."¹¹ In fact, as Woodward prepared to leave, the Westos presented him with a boy as a gift. Woodward also noted that the Westos were "at continuall wars" with other

⁹ It bears mentioning that the phrase "labor shortage" is relative in this usage. Carolina's planters needed labor to turn the sort of profit they believed befitted the climate of their new colony.

¹⁰ Woodward's *Faithfull Relation of My Westoe Voiage* was written in December 1674. It appears in A.S. Salley, ed., *Narratives of Early Carolina, 1650-1708* (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1911; rpr. Barnes & Noble, 1939 and 1959), 125-134; and as "Woodwards Westo Discovery" in Langdon Cheves, ed., *The Shaftesbury Papers*, 456-462.

¹¹ Woodward in Salley, ed., *Narratives of Early Carolina*, 133.

western peoples, notably Muskogees and Cherokees.¹² Upon his return to Lord Shaftesbury's plantation, Woodward expected that the Westos would come back in the spring of 1675 with "deare skins, furr and younge slaves."¹³ Woodward's Westo voyage inaugurated a short-lived but profitable trade between the Westos and Carolina, with serious consequences for native people in the region.

The Westos' skill at raiding coastal and interior communities was enhanced by the fact that they were the only firearm-equipped indigenous group in the area. Stephen Bull, Anthony Ashley Cooper's deputy, reported back to his boss regarding the Westos. They were

another sorte of Indians that live backwards
in an intier body & war agt all Indians they
are called Westoes & doe strike a great
feare in these Indians havinge gunns &
powder & shott & doe come upon these Indians
heere in the tyme of their cropp & destroy
all by killinge Caryinge away their Corne &
Children & eat them ...¹⁴

¹² Though it is not mentioned explicitly, these could have been undertaken for the purposes of slaving and taking dressed skins; this would repeat a pattern established by the Five Nations in previous decades.

¹³ Woodward in Salley, ed., *Narratives of Early Carolina*, 134. This should not be taken to mean that Anthony Ashley Cooper, Lord Shaftesbury, ever resided at the plantation—he just owned it.

¹⁴ Stephen Bull to Lord Ashley, September 12, 1670, in Langdon Cheves, ed., *The Shaftesbury Papers*, 192-196. Quotation appears on 194.

It didn't hurt that the Westos had developed a reputation as cannibals. This may or may not have been the case, but the Westos were already terrifying enough by 1670 for coastal peoples to welcome Carolina's first English settlement.¹⁵ In the years after 1670, the Westos sold their captives exclusively to the English at Charles Town. This shift reoriented the entire Indian slave trade to Carolina. The type of violence unleashed by the Westos could only have existed within the specific historical circumstances that obtained in the shattered world of the early Southeast. The Westos' exploitation of the prevailing conditions may have served as an example to other groups in the region, specifically Shawnees (known to white Carolinians as Savannahs), and the Yamasees.

Almost as soon as they arrived, the English began to remake the landscape in ways that made violence all but inevitable. Their alliance and trading relationship with the Westos was only the first in a series of moves designed to enrich Carolina's landowners—at the expense of the proprietors, who intended a monopoly on the Indian trade for themselves. The proprietors sought to enhance their colony's profits and avoid violence. In the Southeast, however, profit and violence were inextricably linked.

¹⁵ Bowne, *Westo Indians*, 79; and Verner W. Crane, *The Southern Frontier, 1670-1732* (New York: Norton edition, 1981; orig. 1928), 6.

The Savannahs: Shawnee Outpost in the Southeast

The English relationship with the Savannahs is less widely known and thoroughly studied than that with the Westos and Yamasees, but it provides some important clues as to how English violence was beginning to transform the Southeast. The story of the Savannahs before they migrated to the fringe of the Carolina colony is not too well known. The specific Shawnee community that became the Savannahs probably had roots in the Ohio and Cumberland valleys in the seventeenth century. Five Nations Iroquois pressure on the Shawnees began around this time, and violence intensified throughout the 1660s and 1670s. Shawnees responded to Iroquois raids by abandoning the Ohio and Cumberland country. Hundreds of Shawnees ended up at Fort St. Louis in central Illinois, while others moved into the Southeast.¹⁶ At least one community of Shawnees settled on the Savannah River. It is almost inconceivable that the Shawnees had no experience as captive-takers before their involvement in the slave trade, since most indigenous peoples in eastern North America engaged in the practice on some level.¹⁷ Like the Westos

¹⁶ As important as the Shawnees were to nineteenth century American history, it is surprising so little has been written about them in earlier time periods. See James H. Howard, *Shawnee! The Ceremonialism of a Native Indian Tribe and Its Cultural Background* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981), esp. 1-23; Jerry E. Clark, *The Shawnee* (Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 1993), esp. 5-27; and Erminie Wheeler-Voegelin and Helen Hornbeck Tanner, *Indians of Ohio and Indiana Prior to 1795*, Vol. 1 (New York: Garland, 1974), esp. 30-37.

¹⁷ June Namias, "Captives," and Theda Perdue, "Slavery" in Frederick E. Hoxie, ed., *Encyclopedia of North American Indians: Native American History*,

before them, it is also highly unlikely that the Savannahs moved accidentally into the English sphere of influence. The Savannah migration to Carolina's backcountry indicates a desire for trade. In the parlance of immigration studies, Carolina's potential for trade was a "pull factor" that attracted Native Americans from surrounding regions.

An early Savannah appearance on the fringe of Carolina was witnessed by Dr. Henry Woodward. Woodward recorded a critical early meeting between Savannahs and Westos near the close of his *Westoe Voiage*. Eric Bowne suggests that this was an advance party of Shawnees looking for potential settlement sites near sources of English trade.¹⁸ Woodward's description of the meeting is as spare as his treatment of the Westos in general, but it does provide some clues about Shawnee motives and the extent of Shawnee migrations. The Shawnees, or Savannahs, were returning from trading with the Spanish at Florida, though the travelers were apparently disappointed with Spanish unwillingness to provide them with guns. They passed along a rumor of an impending attack on the Westos, perhaps in an effort to curry favor with the powerful Westos.¹⁹

Culture, and Life from Paleo-Indians to the Present (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1996), 99-101 and 596-598, respectively.

¹⁸ Bowne, *Westo Indians*, 85. Given the Shawnees' history of organized, methodical migrations, this explanation makes sense.

¹⁹ Woodward in Salley, ed., *Narratives of Early Carolina*, 133-134.

The Westo War

Ten years after the founding of the colony at Charles Town, the English were in a position to assert their dominance over the Westos, who had apparently outlived their usefulness as slave raiders and trading partners. In early 1680, the Westo War erupted. The causes of the war are tied up in the politics of English Carolina: essentially, Woodward and the proprietors intended to regulate trade with Indians, while a planter faction known as the Goose Creek Men desired to expand the trade as far inland as possible.²⁰ To achieve this goal, the Goose Creek Men armed the Savannahs. The Savannahs proceeded to defeat and enslave much of the Westo population. Governor, and proprietor, John Archdale would later write that

the Hand of God was eminently seen in thinning the *Indians*, to make room for the *English*. As for Example in *Carolina*, in which were seated Two Potent Nations, called the *Westoes*, and *Sarannah*, which contained many Thousands, who broke out into an unusual Civil War, and thereby reduced themselves into a small Number, and the *Westoes*, the more Cruel of the two, were at the last forced quite out of that Province,

²⁰ Galloway, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 60-61.

and the *Sarannahs* continued good Friends and useful Neighbors to the *English*.²¹

Archdale's most obvious omission is the fact that English traders bore some responsibility for the conflict. When Savannahs fought Westos, moreover, it was not an "unusual Civil War," but a war of enslavement fought by two distinct peoples.

In its fighting, the war itself seems to have been a rather lopsided affair. Hostilities began in the winter of 1679-80 and flared sporadically into the early 1680s. Hundreds of captured Westos were brought to Charles Town and sold into West Indian slavery.²² The war also appears to have begun with some treachery on the part of white Carolinians. A 1683 letter from the proprietors chided the colonists for the "heads of the Westohs being taken whilst they were in treaty with that Government ... & put to death in Cold blood & the rest Driven from their country."²³ No firsthand accounts of the actual combat survive, and recent historians have been reluctant to speculate too

²¹ John Archdale's 1707 "A New Description of That Fertile and Pleasant Province of Carolina," appears in B.R. Carroll, ed., *Historical Collections of South Carolina* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1836), 85-120. Quotation appears on 88-89. The language in the passage owes much to its author's background; he perceived Native Americans as a single race, and explicitly called out the role of God in preparing the land for English colonization.

²² Bowne, *Westo Indians*, 100; and J. Leitch Wright, *The Only Land They Knew*, 107.

²³ Proprietors to Government and Council in Charles Town, September 30, 1683. *Records in the British Public Record Office Relating to South Carolina, 1663-1782*, 37 volumes (Columbia: South Carolina Department of Archives and History, 1973), 1:256. Hereafter, the collection will be abbreviated BPRO.

much.²⁴ Two facts about the Westo War are beyond dispute. First, it dispersed the Westos as a people; splinter groups moved north to Iroquoia and west to what would become Creek country.²⁵ Second, it resulted in the ascendance of the Savannahs to the role of Carolina's main Indian trading partner, with all the attendant advantages and disadvantages thereof.

Not surprisingly, the proprietors—who found out about the war far too late to affect its prosecution or outcome—voiced strong disapproval and placed the blame for the conflict squarely on the white Carolinians:

"If friendships had been preserved with ye Westos it would have kept all the neighbouring Indians from dareing to offend you; and if you had protected them from being injured by the Westoes, that protection would have made them love as well as feare you which consideration hath been ye maine inducement of our endeveaours to hold a fayre correspondence wuth ye Westoes by making ourselves usefull to them by trade."

²⁴ Accounts of the war can be found in Chapman Milling, *Red Carolinians* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1940), 82-83; Verner Crane, *The Southern Frontier*, 18-21; and Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 57-58.

²⁵ Bowne, *Westo Indians*, 106-107.

The letter quoted above goes on to note, significantly, that "Peace is in the Interest of Planters."²⁶ In South Carolina's lowcountry, it would be more accurate to say that war was in the interest of planters. Planters benefited from lands vacated by fleeing Indians, and if two neighboring groups went to war, Carolina's traders could expect an influx of new slaves.

The proprietors also suspected that the Westo War was undertaken for inappropriate reasons. A March 1681 letter reminded the colonists that the proprietors as yet had "no Depositions to prove the matter of fact on which this warr was grounded." As such, they "could not well judg whether this war was made upon a reall necessity for the preservation of the Collony, or to serve the ends of particular men by trade."²⁷ The difference between "reall necessity" and "the ends of particular men" was not at all clear to Carolina's colonizers. Carolina in the late seventeenth century survived and turned a profit on an exploitative trade in Indian goods and human beings.

In the aftermath of the war, the Savannahs replaced the Westos as English Carolina's most powerful Indian allies, and its most prominent slave raiders. In the late seventeenth-century Southeast, these two roles coincided. Thomas Newe, a

²⁶ Craven, Albemarle, Shaftesbury and P. Colleton to the Governor and Council att Ashley River, February 21, 1680/1. BPRO, 1:104-105.

²⁷ Craven, Shaftesbury, and P. Colleton to the Governor and Council att Ashley River in Carolina, March 7, 1680/1. BPRO, 1:115-120. Quotations appear on 115.

young colonist, described the Savannahs in 1682 as "the most potent Kingdome of the Indians armed by us."²⁸ This distinction would eventually belong to a third group: the Yamasees.

The Yamasees did not replace the Savannahs overnight. In the 1680s, both communities occupied prime locations to operate between the Indian world of the interior and the English world of Charles Town. In the decades between 1680 and 1710, the story of the Savannahs is fuzzy to a frustrating degree. It is clear that the Savannahs and Carolina saw some advantage in maintaining a relationship, and it is equally clear that Savannahs were beginning to sour on living in the Southeast, maybe even a family or kin group at a time. John Lawson, in the account of his 1701 trip through the Southeast, described the Savannahs as a "famous, warlike, friendly Nation of Indians."²⁹

The proceedings of the Commons House of Assembly refer to the Savannahs during 1707 and 1708 as the "Revolted Savanas" and the "deserted Savanas," and the choice of words is telling: the Savannahs had revolted, but had done so by leaving.³⁰ Some

²⁸ Thomas Newe, "Letters of Thomas Newe," in Salley, ed., *Narratives of Early Carolina*, 177-187. Quotation appears on 182.

²⁹ John Lawson, *A New Voyage to Carolina*, edited with an introduction by Hugh Talmadge Lefler (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1967; orig. London, 1709), 48. For a useful discussion of colonial authors' propensity to employ "warlike" to describe people, see Gallay, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 173-175.

³⁰ *Journal of the Commons House of Assembly* (hereafter JCHA, with appropriate dates), June 5, 1707-July 19, 1707, edited by A.S. Salley (Columbia: Historical Commission of South Carolina); references to the revolt and desertion of the Savannahs occur on 26, 27, and 28. Gallay relied on these journals in *Indian Slave Trade*, 210-212. The Savannahs may have been fleeing

Savannahs moved to Maryland and Pennsylvania. Shawnee identity was highly transferable; it did not preclude related communities from dwelling far apart. Nor did it preclude individuals and families from moving between far-flung settlements. Compared to the Westos and Yamasees, the Savannahs seem to have fared the best in their encounter with Carolina colony in its early years.

Yamasee Genesis and the Early Yamasee-Carolina Alliance

In the 1680s, the Yamasees began their migration to Carolina. The precise origins of the Yamasees, like their language, may never be known, but the basic contours of their migrations are increasingly clear thanks to underused and recently uncovered documents and archaeological sites on the eastern seaboard. By the 1660s, the Yamasees existed in pockets on the fringes of the Spanish mission province of Guale and the more northerly province of Escamaçu. The evidence is scant, but most of it seems to indicate that the Yamasees were an ethnically diverse group of Native peoples seeking refuge from raids carried out by Chichimecos (Westos) and others. A 1663 letter written by the Franciscan Carlos de Anguiano placed a string of Yamasee towns "six, eight, four, three, two, and more days distant by road" from Guale—directly between the

Catawba attacks; it's also possible they recognized the danger of getting drawn too close to Carolina's Indian trade.

Chichimecos and the missions.³¹ The very looseness of their allegiance to the Spanish helped mark these refugees as Yamasees, since the term came to apply to any number of smaller ethnic groups who, although they were connected to the Spanish through trade, continually refused baptism. As raids intensified, the Yamasees abandoned their outlying villages and moved more solidly into the mission provinces—a 1681 census notes various "aggregations of Yamace Indians" throughout Guale and Mocama; the same source is careful to distinguish between Christian Indians and "pagan Yamazes."³² In exchange for Spanish military protection, some subjected themselves to the *repartimiento*. Still, the Yamasee-Spanish alliance was a strategic choice on the part of some Yamasees, and when the relationship outlived its usefulness, they left the mission provinces *en masse*.

The Yamasees moved away from the Spanish missions and replaced the Westos and Savannahs in the Savannah River country and the Sea Islands, wedged in between the Spanish and English.

³¹ Fray Carlos Anguiano, Letter of April 1663, Translated by John E. Worth in *The Struggle for the Georgia Coast: An Eighteenth-Century Spanish Retrospective on Guale and Mocama*, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History No. 75 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1995), 92. The term Chichimeco has led to a fair amount of confusion, since it was applied to raiding groups throughout northern New Spain. In the seventeenth century Southeast, the term Chichimeco referred to the people known to the English as Westos (Richahecrians or Ricohockrians).

³² Captain Francisco de Fuentes, 1681 Census of Guale and Mocama, translated by Worth in *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 101. This should not imply that the Yamasees integrated themselves fully into the mission system. For the best overviews of late seventeenth-century Yamasee life, see Worth's introductory essay to *Struggle for the Georgia Coast* and Galloway's *Indian Slave Trade*.

The English welcomed the Yamasees and placed them into the same mental space that had been previously occupied by the Savannahs and Westos. The Native world of the Southeast was in flux as the remnants of chiefdoms dispersed, whether as a result of disease or slave raids, and reformulated themselves into new polities and ethnicities. At the highest level, competing empires faced off against each other, though on the ground in the Southeast, the struggle was carried out by ambitious friars, traders, planters, pirates and their Native allies.

From their position near Port Royal, the Yamasees became English Carolina's main trading and raiding partners—in the minds of the Europeans settled at Charles Town, they became the new Westos. The mass migration to South Carolina was the defining moment in the history of the Yamasees. It marked a transformation between two types of identity: a local identification and a Pan-Indian or multi-ethnic one more suited to the rigors of life wedged between two colonial powers.³³ In a way, the move from Florida to Carolina was a Yamasee Middle Passage. It demonstrates a link between migration and ethnogenesis that parallels other, better understood population movements.³⁴

³³ Bradley Schrager, "Yamasee Indians and the Challenge of Spanish and English Colonialism in the North American Southeast, 1660-1715" (Ph.D. diss., Northwestern University 2001), 71-72.

³⁴ See, for instance, James Merrell, *The Indians' New World: Catawbas and their Neighbors from European Contact through the Era of Removal* (Chapel

The Yamasees arrived at about the same time as Lord Henry Cardross was planting his colony of Stuart's Town. In a letter dated March 27, 1685, Lord Cardross and William Dunlop relayed their goals to Sir Peter Colleton, one of the Lords Proprietors of Carolina. In the dream world of long-term colonial goals, the Scots intended to find a Southwest Passage of sorts—a route from Port Royal to New Mexico in an effort to subvert Spanish mining profits, "which if effectuated would be a matter of vast importance both to you and us."³⁵ More short-term, pragmatic motives lay behind the conscious effort to befriend the Yamasees, whom the Scots reckoned "the most considerable" of the area's Native peoples. The Scottish colonists were blunt about the reasons for the alliance: "we have consented to them that they remain here during their good behaviour, and the truth is they are so considerable and warlike that we would not do otherwise."³⁶ Cardross also averred that it was in the interest of the Scots and English to keep the large number of Yamasees "effectually," since they were "Inveterate enemies to the

Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1989) and Galloway, *Choctaw Genesis*. James Carson touches on several recent interpretations in *Searching for the Bright Path*, 9-11.

³⁵ Lord Henry Cardross and William Dunlop to Peter Colleton, March 27, 1685, quoted in George Pratt Insh, "Arrival of the Cardross Settlers," *South Carolina Historical and Genealogical Magazine* 30:2 (April 1929), 69-80; quotation appears on 75. See also Insh, "The Carolina Merchant: Advice of Arrival," *The Scottish Historical Review* 25 (1928), 99-108.

³⁶ Cardross and Dunlop to Colleton, quoted in Insh, "Arrival of the Cardross Settlers," 76.

Spainzard."³⁷ Cardross and Dunlop were probably correct in their assessment of Yamasee strength. At a time when the Scots' population hovered in the fifties and the numbers of English and African people were about 1,400 and 500 respectively, the English slave trader Caleb Westbrook wrote from Port Royal and estimated the number of Yamasees in the region at "a thousand or more" and expected that figure to rise daily.³⁸

Soon after their withdrawal from the Spanish sphere of influence, a force of Yamasees carried out a devastating raid on a mission in Timucua. The expedition offers an excellent opportunity to explore the intricacies of Native and European violence in the Southeast. A party of Yamasees under Altamaha attacked Santa Catalina de Afuyca (Ajoyca) in 1685 in a fashion that bespoke a potent combination of old enmity, anti-Catholic feeling, and new economic motives provided by the Scots and Westbrook of Stuart's Town. Niquisalla, a cacique from Guale with prior knowledge of the attack, cited longstanding Yamasee-Timucua hatred as a motivating factor.³⁹

³⁷ Cardross and Dunlop to Colleton, quoted in Insh, "Arrival of the Cardross Settlers," 76.

³⁸ The population figures come from Peter Wood, "The Changing Population of the Colonial South: An Overview by Race and Region, 1685-1790," in Peter Wood, Gregory Waselkov, and M. Thomas Hatley, eds., *Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 46. Westbrook's letter, dated February 21, 1685, can be found in BPRO 2:8-9.

³⁹ Amy Turner Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana: Spain's Support System for the Presidio and Mission Provinces of Florida*, Anthropological Papers of the American Museum of Natural History No. 74 (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 166-67.

When several Yamasees appeared before colonial officials months later in Charles Town, they described a horrific scene: the raiders "burnt severall Townes and in particuler the said Chappell and the Fryers house."⁴⁰ The Yamasees, who remained unconverted and recognized by the Spanish and English as pagans and infidels, struck forcefully at the symbols of mission life. The dawn raid resulted in the destruction or theft of religious articles and texts. Yamasee actions that morning seem to have moved beyond the quest for immediate profit. Their destruction of the chapel and friary indicate a forceful rejection of Spanish missionization. The cost in human lives was also dear: fifty Timucuans perished, and twenty-two were carried off as slaves.⁴¹

Enmity between the Timucuas and Yamasees and Yamasee mistrust of Catholic intentions could have developed without any external persuasion. But the looming presence of Carolina's slave market and the actions of Lord Cardross and Caleb Westbrook also played some role, as evidence before and after the Santa Catalina raid shows. Prior to the attack, John Chaplin reported to Henry Woodward, Carolina's resident Indian expert, that he saw "armes and other things delivered to the Yamases."⁴² Woodward reminded the colony's deputy governor that this was a

⁴⁰ "The Examination of Severall Yamasse Indians," BPRO 2:66.

⁴¹ "The Examination of Severall Yamasse Indians," BPRO 2:66.

⁴² Henry Woodward to John Godfrey (Deputy Governor), March 21, 1685, BPRO 2:49.

bad idea, since it would inflame tensions between the Spanish and English unnecessarily. It seemed unlikely that the Spanish, should they choose to retaliate from St. Augustine, would distinguish between Scottish and English plantations.⁴³ The Yamasee testimony given after the raid also mentioned that it was carried out at Westbrook's suggestion, but this may have been an easy way for the Yamasees to deflect blame. The trader and the Scots had armed the Yamasees with muskets and swords, and Lord Cardross had paid the Yamasees for the slaves and other booty taken during the assault.⁴⁴

The conflict highlights some divisions between the Scots, the English, and the Lords Proprietors. The Scots had initially settled at Port Royal with the permission of the Lords Proprietors, but shortly thereafter had come into conflict with the English at Charles Town. Both Charles Town and Stuart's Town were under the nominal control of the proprietors, but that meant very little in Carolina. At one point, Henry Woodward had been arrested by the Scots, whose leaders claimed independence from the government at Charles Town. In retaliation for Woodward's detention, and the unauthorized Yamasee raid in Timucua, warrants were issued at Charles Town for the arrest of

⁴³ When the Spanish retaliated in 1686, they did attack both Stuart's Town and several English plantations further to the north.

⁴⁴ "The Examination of Severall Yamasee Indians," BPRO 2:66; see also Bushnell, *Situado and Sabana*, 166-67, and Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 45-46.

Lord Cardross. James Moore, a leading Indian slaver and proponent of the deregulation of Indian trade in general, was behind the effort.⁴⁵ English traders were not upset that the proprietors had been shown up—their disdain for proprietary rule was well established; they were more concerned with the fact that a Scots-Yamasee alliance would deprive the English of the profits from any slaves taken in Yamasee raids. In the opening decade of the eighteenth century, then-Governor Moore would get his chance.

The Santa Catalina raid demonstrates the utility of the close study of violence as a way to understand the early colonial Southeast. The Yamasees might have attacked the mission of their own accord. Their disdain for proselytizing Franciscans was well documented. Their rivalry with the Timucuas might have roots even deeper than the fact that the Timucuas were Christian and the Yamasees were not. At the same time, external forces were shaping Yamasee violence. Chief among these was the developing market for Indian slaves at Stuart's Town and Charles Town. The trader Caleb Westbrook and Lord Cardross did not necessarily provide the main motivation for the raid; for instance, it seems unlikely that they suggested to burn the chapel and friary and take religious texts. Still, their gift of weaponry ensured that the raid would result in a larger number

⁴⁵ Galloway, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 79-80.

of captives, and gave the Yamasees incentive to bring the captives to Stuart's Town, not Charles Town, for sale. Even when the nations of England and Spain were officially at peace, colonizers representing those nations in the American Southeast clashed violently.

Spanish forces sent by Governor Juan Márquez Cabrera fell on the recently abandoned Stuart's Town in 1686 and burned it to the ground. Proceeding to the northeast, they wreaked havoc in several English plantations, carrying off slaves, silver, and a robe taken during the raid on the Santa Catalina mission.⁴⁶ The attack slowed English expansion along the coast of Georgia and put a temporary halt to Yamasee depredations. The events of the 1680s set the stage for the much larger conflict of the first decade of the eighteenth century.

One avenue that requires further exploration is the changing meaning of captivity in eastern Native America. At various points, and for many groups, captivity stopped serving a social purpose and began to serve an economic one. Of course, social and economic motivations cannot be so easily separated. Economics alone are not enough to explain why adoption of captives slowed, and the sale of captives to slave traders picked up. The answer is probably related to the uncertainties of Native American life in the colonial world: some groups like

⁴⁶ Worth, *Struggle for the Georgia Coast*, 146-71.

the Savannah/Shawnees saw advantages in remaining mobile, not getting attached to their present surroundings. Other groups, most notably the large interior Creek and Cherokee nations, while nominally slave raiders, saw the benefits of remaining rooted and letting refugees from smaller, collapsing polities swell their ranks. One thing is certain: the practice of traveling long distances to secure slaves for eventual sale as forms of chattel property did not exist before extensive contact with Europeans. In the early years of Carolina's white settlement, indigenous communities in the Southeast had to choose between being enslaved by people working for Carolina planters and traders, or trading for arms and enslaving their neighbors.

Raiding Spanish Florida in the Early Eighteenth Century

War between European powers was nothing out of the ordinary around the turn of the eighteenth century. European imperialism did, however, alter the goals of violence in the Southeast at the same time as it expanded the scope of violence and provided new motivations to fight. Queen Anne's War was the American theater of the larger War of the Spanish Succession, which lasted from 1701 to 1714.

Alan Gally has referred to impending hostilities between England and the combination of France and Spain as "the worst-

kept secret in America."⁴⁷ Imperially-minded white Carolinians recognized that Florida and Louisiana could combine to thwart Carolina's expansion and dominance. South Carolina's Commons House of Assembly petitioned the proprietors for shot, powder, cutlasses and field pieces in August of 1701, noting that "a War is already or will immediately break out between the Kingdom of England and the Confederates thereof and the Kingdom of France and Spain." In the coming conflict, Carolina could be left vulnerable since it was "a Frontier to the Spanish and French who have threatned to attack us and have lately attempted by their Spies to withdraw the Yamasee Indians from us to them and so to invite the other Indyan to make Warr upon us."⁴⁸

The stakes had also risen in the Southeast, since a new empire was on the scene. The French, all but absent from the region since the 1560s, had returned and established Biloxi in 1699 and Mobile in 1702. The fact that Charles Town's elites, about 500 miles from Biloxi and Mobile, viewed the French as interlopers demonstrates their aims on a regional—not to say continental—scale. French colonizer Pierre Le Moyne d'Iberville and his younger brother Jean-Baptiste Le Moyne de Bienville had their own ambitious plan for the Southeast. Nicknamed "Projet sur la Caroline," the idea was to weaken English influence over

⁴⁷ Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade*, 135.

⁴⁸ Legislature to John Earl of Bath and the rest of the true and Absolute Lords and Proprietors of the Province of Carolina, BPRO 5:35. The date for the document can be found in Milling, *Red Carolinians*, 105.

the Southeast with an eye toward isolating and eventually destroying Carolina. French investigations in 1702 illuminated just how devastating the English presence had proven for some Southeastern Indians. In a meeting at Mobile, d'Iberville learned that from 1690 or so to 1702, Chickasaws armed by the English had killed 1800 Choctaws and enslaved 500 more.⁴⁹ The French tried to persuade Choctaws and Chickasaws to choose peace and ally against the English: the "ultimate plan of the Englishman, after weakening you by means of wars, is to come and seize you in your villages and then send you to be sold somewhere else, in faraway countries from which you can never return, as the English have treated others, you know."⁵⁰

Carolina's slave raiders and traders continued and escalated their assaults on the missions of Florida as well. Between 1701 and 1706, joint Muskogean-Yamasee-English attacks, the most devastating of which were led by Governor James Moore and Deputy Governor Robert Daniel of South Carolina, annihilated the mission provinces of Apalachee and Timucua, but fell short of capturing the fortified Castillo San Marcos of St. Augustine. This war was a windfall for those engaged in the Indian slave trade, including the Yamasees, but its failure to destroy St.

⁴⁹ Crane, *The Southern Frontier*, 71-72; Daniel H. Usner, Jr., *Indians, Settlers, & Slaves in a Frontier Exchange Economy* (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1992), 18; and Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade*, 130-132.

⁵⁰ Pierre LeMoyne d'Iberville, *Iberville's Gulf Journals*, trans. and ed. Richebourg Gaillard McWilliams (Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press, 1981), 172. Quoted in Gallay, *Indian Slave Trade*, 131-132.

Augustine completely and expel the Spanish struck a nerve with some English, who accused Moore of putting personal profit ahead of the good of the colony.⁵¹ One critic called it a "Project of Freebooting under the specious Name of War."⁵²

From the perspective of the Spanish, and to an even greater extent the mission Indians, the devastation could hardly have been more traumatic.⁵³ A joint English-Indian army of about 900 men left Charles Town overland and by boat in the fall of 1702, and burned several coastal installations on its way to lay siege to St. Augustine. In 1703, James Moore returned at the head of a private army made up almost entirely of Muskogean to wreak further havoc in the mission province of Apalachee. The proceedings near the town of Ayubale in January 1704 were particularly grisly. Muskogean warriors burned sixteen

⁵¹ Galloway, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 135-48. The city of St. Augustine was burned, but Carolina's army failed to take the Castillo San Marcos before it withdrew.

⁵² John Ash, "The Present State of Affairs in Carolina," 1706, in Salley, ed., *Narratives of Early Carolina*, 267-276. Beyond this description, the tenor of which was shared by others, Ash's account is of minimal value. Ash and Moore were on opposite sides of a bitter factional struggle.

⁵³ See *El Escribano* 39 (2002); Galloway, *The Indian Slave Trade*, 135-148; Mark Boyd, Hale Smith, and John Griffin, *Here They Once Stood: The Tragic End of the Apalachee Missions* (Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1951); Crane, *The Southern Frontier*, 71-107; John H. Hann, *A History of the Timucua Indians and Missions* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1996), 268-295; John Worth, *The Timucuan Chiefdoms of Spanish Florida*, 140-146; Charles W. Arnade, *The Siege of St. Augustine in 1702* (University of Florida Monographs, Social Sciences, No. 3, Summer 1959, Gainesville: University of Florida Press, 1959); and Steven Oatis, "To Eat Up a Village of White Men": Anglo-Indian Designs on Mobile and Pensacola, 1705-1715," *Gulf South Historical Review* 14:1 (Fall 1998), 104-119. Overviews of mission life appear in Jerald T. Milanich, *Florida Indians and the Invasion from Europe* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1995); Bonnie G. McEwan, ed., *The Spanish Missions of La Florida* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1993); and John Hann and Bonnie McEwan, *The Apalachee Indians and Mission San Luis* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 1998).

prisoners, and cut out their eyes, tongues, and ears.⁵⁴ Thomas Nairne described the tactics in 1705 when he noted that "We have these two ... past years been intirely kniving all the Indian Towns in Florida which were subject to the Spaniards and have even accomplished it."⁵⁵

South Carolina's frontier defense even relied on the combination of Native and English fighters. Twice during Queen Anne's War, Charles Town came under military threat. The first assault came overland from the Spanish mission provinces in 1701. A handful of Spanish soldiers, along with more than 800 Apalachees, were turned away by a smaller, but more heavily armed force of Muskogean. In 1706, Charles Town repelled a seaborne invasion by the French and Spanish with the assistance of Santee Indians from the Lowcountry.⁵⁶

For Native communities outside of Florida, the message was clear: English Carolina was the major European player in the American Southeast. Though the Yamasees and English had not taken the heavily fortified heart of St. Augustine, they had burned the town and weakened Spanish religious and civil authority pretty much everywhere else. The fighting demonstrated that Yamasees, other Native groups, and English, though they

⁵⁴ For a blow-by-blow account of Moore's activities, see the list of destroyed missions in Mark Boyd, Hale Smith, and John Griffen, *Here They Once Stood*, 11-13. The torture testimony comes from a July 8, 1704, letter by Manuel Solana to Governor Zúñiga at San Luis, in *Here They Once Stood*, 50-55.

⁵⁵ Nairne quoted in Crane, *The Southern Frontier*, 81.

⁵⁶ Oatis, *A Colonial Complex*, 51-52; and Crane, *Southern Frontier*, 86-87.

conceived of violence in different ways, could work together toward common goals. The English had combined diverse Native people into large multiethnic war parties. This included Muskogean from different towns, who may have recognized that they shared important goals or historical experiences in common. In this way, English imperialism played a crucial role in Creek nation-building.

The violence of Queen Anne's War also could also be chaotic and point toward unintended consequences. Even groups that were allied with the English were not guaranteed immunity from enslavement in such violent times. Steven Oatis has recently brought to light two incidents in which Carolina traders paid Cherokees to take slaves from Muskogean towns whose contributions were essential to Carolina's war efforts. Continuing down that road, the legislature reasoned, "may be Very Prejudiciall to this Collony by Giveing great disincouragemt to Such of the nations that are in Amity with us to be any further Assisting to this Collony, now in this Time of Warr."⁵⁷

The fighting of the early eighteenth century represents an awakening of sorts on the part of the English at Carolina. The colony's government began to perceive Carolina as a leading edge of empire in the Southeast. Raids in the 1700s served a number

⁵⁷ Oatis, *A Colonial Complex*, 53; JCHA, April 29, 1703.

of functions. In addition to enriching the men who led them and drawing more slaves to auction at Charles Town, they also sought to establish English dominance over a territory contested by multiple European empires. This imperial perspective underlay the criticism directed at James Moore for his inability to vanquish the Spanish completely, even though his mission was a success from a financial standpoint. Moore himself had warned the Commons House of Assembly in August of 1701 that French liberality could turn former Native allies into enemies. Moore also explicitly compared the situation in South Carolina to the violent border between French Canada and New England.⁵⁸ The Yamasee War, which forced South Carolina into a defensive position, made it clear that while the perspective of white Carolinians may have expanded, their ability to project imperial power into the interior was limited.

In a broad sense, the cases of the Westos, Savannahs, and Yamasees are indicative of the kind of violence associated with the early phases of white settlement in Carolina, trade and adaptation to the emerging Atlantic market and colonial realities. Trade itself need not be violent, but the type of trade fomented by Carolina among its Native neighbors all but precluded long-term peaceful, mutually beneficial relations between the peoples of the Southeast. As William Ramsey has

⁵⁸ JCHA, August 13, 1701.

recently shown in the case of the Yamasee War, the nature of the trade between the English and Native Americans and its entanglement with all kinds of diplomatic and cultural issues could itself breed violence.⁵⁹

Conclusion

The sort of violence that took place along Carolina's frontier was neither wholly native nor English in its nature. What happened in South Carolina in the 1670s through the early 1700s is a microcosm of what happened when European violence met Native American violence. In the Southeast, indigenous violence reoriented itself to deal with the realities of the plantation and the trading house, and was eventually circumscribed by these institutions. This is not to say that the English did not conquer the Southeast. The English conquered the Southeast by subverting forms of violence they perceived as savage; the plantation and trading house were violent institutions, but

⁵⁹ William L. Ramsey, "'Something Cloudy in Their Looks': The Origins of the Yamasee War Reconsidered," *Journal of American History* 90:1 (June 2003), 44-75, esp. n. 5. For works that treat the significance of trade, see Joel Martin, "Southeastern Indians and the English Trade in Skins and Slaves," in Charles Hudson and Carmen Tesser, eds., *The Forgotten Centuries: Indians and Europeans in the American South, 1521-1704* (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1994), 304-324; James Merrell, "'Our Bond of Peace': Patterns of Intercultural Exchange in the Carolina Piedmont, 1650-1750," in Peter Wood, Gregory Waselkov, and M. Thomas Hatley, eds., *Powhatan's Mantle: Indians in the Colonial Southeast* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989), 196-222; and Kathryn Holland Braund, *Deerskins & Duffels: Creek Indian Trade with Anglo-America, 1685-1815* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1993). As Ramsey points out, the study of the fur trade has produced one of the best such works: Richard White's *The Middle Ground: Indians, Empires, and Republics in the Great Lakes Region, 1650-1815* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).

English planters did not seem to mind the type of violence they could control.