On June 25, 1856, John Deming lost his job as a “hand” at a Northampton, Massachusetts farm implement manufactory. He was fired for his fierce support of the new Republican Party and its presidential candidate, John C. Fremont. Just weeks after the caning of Charles Sumner, Deming was hardly alone among western Massachusetts voters in his desire to curtail the “Slave Power.” However, Deming’s antislavery politics proved intolerable to his employers at the Bay State Tool Manufacturing Company, an enterprise that produced hoes for use on slave plantations in the American South. The firing was a public relations debacle for Bay State, particularly once the just-fired Deming read an antislavery poem by John Greenleaf Whittier at a huge Republican rally in Northampton. According to a newspaper account, Deming stood before a “large banner containing a representation of the assault on Senator Sumner with ‘We will Subdue You’ underneath, and below the whole the large inscription ‘Fremont and Freedom.’”

Desperate to save his firm’s reputation, Jonathan Bailey scrambled to set the record straight. He convinced thirty-seven operatives to sign a circular stating that “we have been told by our employers to enjoy freely our own political preferences, and to vote for whom we please.” The Springfield Argus and the Hampshire Gazette published the testimonial and insinuated that Deming had been fired for other reasons altogether. Bailey also wrote a nervous letter to Oliver and Oakes Ames, from whom the company
received much of the iron it used to fabricate tools. Soon to be prominent in Republican and antislavery politics, the Ames brothers surely required an explanation of the Deming firing. “I have to say that I am no politician,” explained Bailey, who had “not been to the ballot box for several years.” Bailey contended “that business and politics ought not to be mixed up,” but rather than addressing the particular relationship of Northern industry and Southern slavery, he advanced the general principle that no corporate enterprise should have a party affiliation. “This company was organized for the purpose of manufacturing Hoes and Forks,” Bailey wrote to the Ames brothers. “Political, Religious, & moral questions are commodities that we do not deal in as a Co.”

Even as he asserted a distinction between commercial practices and moral considerations, Bailey would not have denied that a “business ethics” governed the American economy. That code, however, was centered on promptness in payment and honest brokering as components of trustworthiness and a masculine honor culture. The eighteenth-century debates on the abolition of the Atlantic slave trade had shown how readily commercial practices might be re-conceptualized as ethical dilemmas, but by the middle of the nineteenth century, only the smallest percentage of white Americans would have seen the manufacturing of hoes as a comparable moral problem. Making hoes required the same tools and materials as fabricating shackles for slaving voyages, but the manufacturers of these items were not equally culpable in the evil of slavery. For a Northern firm to market agricultural implements “expressly adapted for the South” was not tantamount to being a slaveholder. Even the most strident advocates of “clean hands”—those who abstained from wearing cotton clothing and putting sugar in their tea—had little to say about Northern businesses that furnished plantations with blankets,
shoes, and clothing. Moral reformers faulted the timberman who sold barrel staves to a rum distiller, but hesitated to indict the Northern seamstress who stitched suits and dresses for slaves to wear.  

However, at a time when slavery stood as the key moral problem in American society, the producers of “plantation goods” could hardly isolate their businesses from other considerations as readily and decisively as Bailey claimed. To the contrary, Northern businessmen in “the Southern trade” faced a series of moral challenges and choices. Some could be resolved with deceptive ease: “would it have been better for the slaves not to have shoes?” was (in so many words) the reputed position of Henry Wilson, the Natick, Massachusetts shoemaker who specialized in slave brogans before his political career carried him into the Vice-Presidency in 1873. But other dilemmas were thornier. Wilson reportedly rejected the offer of a Southern customer to sell slaves in order to pay an overdue shoe bill, but other Northern producers found themselves unexpectedly mired in the slave market when their customers defaulted on their debts. A Northern firm might gain legal ownership of slaves when Southern courts distributed the assets of an insolvent planter, factor, or merchant. “[T]here are hundreds of sober-faced Yankees whom nobody suspects of being implicated in such disgraceful business,” observed one 1840s critic.  

Historians have recently turned their attention to the North’s material interest in slavery, as well as to slavery’s central role in the economic, political, and social development of the United States. Long overdue, many of these insights are nonetheless so obvious that it is galling that they are insights at all. It is a testament to the American master narrative of freedom and the erasure of slavery as a foundational component of
our national history, that few people intuitively connect the story of the Industrial
Revolution to the labor of enslaved Africans and African-Americans on cotton
plantations. It takes about one second to remember that cotton didn’t grow in Lowell, but
it involves a huge conceptual leap to see Massachusetts and Mississippi as part of the
same economy, rather than as separate universes, already far along the divergent paths of
development that would lead to the Civil War.\(^8\)

If slavery has found a place at the center of recent discussions of American
economic development, academic historians cannot claim the bulk of the credit. Much
crucial energy has come from the legal activism of the Reparations Movement. The effort
that began with Deadria Farmer-Paellman’s research into Aetna’s slave policies has not
yielded many verdicts in favor of the descendants of enslaved Americans, but it has
compelled businesses and universities to delve into their records and publicize historical
relationships to slavery. As new municipal ordinances throughout the country have sent
JP Morgan and Wachovia into their corporate archives, the disclosures of slave
mortgages held by predecessor banks have made front-page news in the *Wall Street
Journal* and the *Washington Post*. Brown University’s Slavery and Justice Initiative was
undoubtedly intended to stay one step ahead of Charles Ogletree’s Reparations
Coordinating Committee, and now other universities risk their reputations by not
undertaking similar investigations.\(^9\) At the same time, museums and journalists have
brought these issues before a broad public: Anne Farrow and the *Hartford Courant’s*
investigation into Connecticut’s entanglements with slavery; Charles Rappleye’s award-
winning *Sons of Providence* on the business rivalry of brothers Moses and John Brown;
and three powerful shows on slavery at the New-York Historical Society. Most striking at
the 2005 “Slavery in New York” exhibition was an art installation of a television monitor mimicking the screen design of a present-day financial news network, but with the prices of slaves, cotton, sugar, and rum flying along the so-called crawl, as runaway slave advertisements scrolled down the side of the screen.10

As books on the North’s relationship to slavery carry loaded titles like Complicity, and as corporations scour their archives only to protect their ability to do business in places like Chicago, it might appear to the casual observer that the moral dilemmas entailed in antebellum interregional trade are present-day inventions. That is, a twenty-first century sensibility—whether informed by the politics of racial justice or an ecological awareness of the interconnection of consumers, producers, environments, and political regimes—is being read back on to a past during which these were not moral issues. One of the goals here, then, is to historicize the issue, to uncover the extent to which early Americans conceptualized North-South trade as a moral problem.

Recent scholarship has drawn attention to the politics of using slave-produced sugar and cotton, and the rise of a consumerist branch of Abolitionism that organized boycotts, published newspapers, and even opened “free produce” stores in places like Pennsylvania and Ohio.11 Less is known about the production side of the equation, despite its importance to nineteenth-century political economists, especially in regard to the tariff question. Antebellum Southerners regularly pointed to Northern profits from slavery (through banking, insurance, shipping, and manufacturing) to puncture the claims of Northern abolitionists and protectionists alike. In the aftermath of Abraham Lincoln’s election, sectional economic interdependence was a theme among those attempting to stave off disunion. “How many millions of individuals in the North derive their
subsistence by the production of articles of Southern desire and necessity?” asked Henry Reed in a speech cataloging not the South’s dependence on the North, but rather the converse. “Every man at the North, who makes a plough, a hoe, a shovel, or a cotton-gin, to aid the production of cotton, should be counted as a hand engaged in that crop,” explained another last-gasp effort to save the Union in 1861.12

But well before then, New Englanders had wrestled with the moral implications of a plantation provisioning trade whose origins were in the seventeenth-century export of enslaved Pequots and Narragansetts to the Caribbean. Salt cod, flour, barrel staves, mules, and horses were surely less fraught commodities, but astute eighteenth-century observers nonetheless recognized New England’s dependence upon plantation consumers. They did so precisely at the moment when Rhode Island had perfected its lucrative version of the Triangle Trade: conveying enslaved West Africans across the Atlantic on boats built and outfitted in the colony, exchanging slaves for molasses in the West Indies, and converting molasses into rum in Rhode Island’s numerous distilleries, rum to purchase slaves on the next voyage to West Africa. During the second half of the eighteenth century, this “notorious commerce” generated a fierce opposition that led to a state ban on Atlantic slave trading in 1787, and also an effort to redirect Newport and Providence capital to more salutary ends. It did not take long for John Brown, an advocate of the right to trade in slaves, to burst the bubble of his brother Moses, who hoped to make Rhode Island into a center of textile manufacturing. Skewering these aspirations in 1789, John declared he could “recollect no one place at present from whence the cotton can come, but from the labour of the slaves.”13 And indeed, slave-grown cotton fed the machinery of New England’s Industrial Revolution. The careers of
the two most famous inventors of the 1790s, Eli Whitney and Samuel Slater were forever yoked together, as the rise of the North’s textile industry proceeded in lockstep with the expansion of the slave frontier into Alabama, Mississippi, Arkansas, and Texas. “Cotton thread holds the Union together,” Ralph Waldo Emerson noted in his journal in 1846.¹⁴

New England’s manufacturing revolution involved not merely converting the raw materials of Southern plantations into finished goods, but also producing goods for slaves. For as much as historians have described out-work and cottage industry as important features in the North’s “transition to capitalism,” the destination of palm-leaf hats and simple shoes for the heads and feet of Southern slaves usually rates only passing mention.¹⁵ To be sure, the North’s manufacturers had larger markets at their disposal outside the South. Massachusetts’ shoemakers turned out more footwear for free people in the Midwest and in Northern cities than for enslaved Southerners. In turn, at least through the 1830s, planters purchased the bulk of their provisions from English rather than American manufacturers. Nonetheless, the Northern business of producing plantation goods was substantial, even as economic historians have had little success assigning a dollar value to interregional exchange or isolating plantation goods from other Northern manufactures sold in the South.¹⁶ If plantation goods were not at the center of the North’s manufacturing as a whole, they defined the economies of several dozen localities whose entire livelihoods hinged upon making things for slaves to wear and use.

The story of North Brookfield, Massachusetts (about twenty miles west of Worcester) connects the rise of small-scale manufacturing to the expanding market for plantation provisions. Until the 1810s, “the people in this town, with a very few
exceptions, were farmers, and were making next to no progress in anything profitable, or calculated to elevate their character and promote the cause of morality or civilization,” explained Thomas Snell, the Congregational minister in North Brookfield from 1798 until 1862. Then in 1813, the town became a center of shoe manufacturing, “which furnished profitable employment to almost all classes of people.” As Snell recounted to an audience in the 1850s, “the prosecution and extension of this business soon began to increase our population—buildings were repaired—children handsomely clothed—new habitations began to rise and multiply, till this flourishing village with a busy population stands before you as the result of diligence and reformation from some of our old and impoverishing habits.”

The key figures were Tyler and Ezra Batcheller, who organized the labor of thousands of local families in those famous Massachusetts “ten footers”—the small workshops in which husbands and wives, sons and daughters turned out shoes. In 1832, they produced 62,000 pairs of what would become their most famous product: russet brogans for slaves. This did not go unnoticed in North Brookfield, where Amasa Walker’s house was reputedly a station in the Underground Railroad. Enough of Snell’s congregants opposed Tyler Batcheller’s role as a deacon in the church that they seceded in 1853. Snell himself declared slavery “diametrically opposed to Christianity,” but was unsure how to proceed when he considered the moral reformation that shoe manufacturing had occasioned in North Brookfield. In his effort to narrate the town’s history in 1854, Snell framed the town’s prosperity as a moral problem, albeit one without obvious resolution:
“[T]he life of sale shoe manufactures, every considerate person knows, is Southern Slavery. This incontrovertible fact, however, does not prove that the shoe-business is wrong, or that slavery is right. But it shows one thing, viz: that we should not forget, when men write and talk on these matters, that we are all buying, and building, and riding, and wearing and making gain by drafts upon the fruits of slave-labor. Not one dollar in fifty, passes through our hands that is not probably derived from this source. And whether our feelings and principles accord with this fact, it should certainly terminate all difference and division about the appropriation of what we all willingly receive from this source.”

Snell’s agnosticism may have been dissatisfying to his congregants (and some of us), but it effectively marked the manufacturing of plantation goods as a moral quandary not solely for businessmen and clergymen, but rather for everyone partaking in the North’s economic prosperity. Moreover, Snell confronted the North’s relationship to slavery with more candor than the vast majority of nineteenth or twentieth-century observers.

* * * * * * *

In order to appreciate the range of ethical questions involved in what contemporaries called “the Southern trade,” it may be helpful to focus on a single firm. Rhode Island’s Peace Dale Manufacturing Company was arguably the nation’s largest producer of “Negro cloth,” an ill-defined category of textiles varying by composition, texture, color, and pattern, but united by its explicit purpose of outfitting enslaved people. When Frederick Law Olmstead toured the plantation South in the 1850s, he
observed slave clothing was “mostly made, especially for this purpose, in Providence, R.I.” Olmstead had the correct state, but production was concentrated in southern Rhode Island, with goods shipped from Westerly, or moved through Stonington, Connecticut, the terminus of a regional rail line. Rowland Hazard (1763-1835) began textile manufacturing at Peace Dale at the beginning of the 1800s, with his sons Isaac Peace Hazard (1794-1879), Rowland Gibson Hazard (1801-1888), and Joseph Peace Hazard (1807-1894) taking control of the firm in 1829. As Rowland Gibson Hazard, who assumed the principal position in the company, wrote to an associate that year, “Our attention has been principally directed to the manufacture of coarse woolens mostly for the Southern markets.”

The South was a relatively new outlet for New England textiles, as English mills had long controlled the trade in woolen and cotton blankets, ready-made clothing, and cloth to American plantations. Industrialized earlier, English manufacturing produced goods celebrated for their cheapness, not their durability. When Baltimore merchant Thomas Edmondson wrote to a Cumberland, England, woolen manufacturer in 1806, he explained that their fabrics would need more “substance” since they were intended “for Jackets & Trousers for the Black People that work on the Plantations.” The slaves “have a great deal of rough and harde work & unless they have something that will bear it, they soon gett into rags.” Edmondson concluded with a gentle reminder that “we have it much colder than you have it in Cumberland, and a Jacket & Trouser with a coarse shirt is the only dress these people have.” Not long after this exchange, the Embargo and Napoleonic Wars put a stop to English imports, and as Charleston slaveholder Henry Izard wrote to Delaware manufacturer Victor DuPont in 1811, “Our supplies of woolen
cloth must be sought at home.” American textile manufactories proliferated during the prolonged War of 1812. Peace in 1815, however, brought the return of cheap English goods and made it likely that the “Negroes’ Trousers” advertised that year in a Baltimore newspaper were constructed of imported fabrics.23

The ability of American manufacturers to gain footing in the Southern market owed to tariffs favorable to “coarse” goods passed in 1816 and 1824, as well as to personal and familial networks that allowed entrepreneurs to enter the market with products tailored to local demand. After Joseph Downing settled in Port Gibson, Mississippi, as a retail merchant in 1819, he began sending information on textiles to his former associates in Wilmington, Delaware. “Nothing would give me more pleasure than to hear of the success of the manufacturers on the Brandywine, & whatever I can do to promote their interest in this quarter will be cheerfully done,” Downing wrote to the DuPonts, before commenting on the marketability of their various fabric blends of cotton and wool. New York manufacturer George Smith received reports on the state of the New Orleans market from co-religionist Levi Beebee, who wove messages of evangelical faith into his advice for the Hope Factory in Cooperstown. The Hazards found their tutor in John Potter, a South Carolina rice planter who took the visiting Isaac Hazard to view textile samples in the storehouses of several Charleston merchants in 1824. Isaac relayed intelligence back to his brother in Rhode Island. “The opinion respecting colours appears to be so various that I cannot form any idea which are best,” Rowland Gibson Hazard replied from Peace Dale, along with the news that he was busily at work on a sample to impress Potter. As Isaac continued to represent the firm in the South during the 1820s, his brother sent frequent advice from Rhode Island. “I think if thee can get time it would be
best for thee to go to New Orleans this winter & make arrangements for the sale of our goods there,” suggested Rowland Gibson Hazard in 1827.24

As the Quaker diction might suggest, the Hazards brought antislavery credentials to their business. “College Tom” Hazard (1720-1798) was a Yale graduate who was nearly disinherited by his father in 1742 for refusing a wedding present of slaves and a plantation in southern Rhode Island. After the American Revolution, “College Tom” allied with Moses Brown to advocate gradual emancipation in Rhode Island and to found the Providence Abolition Society in 1789. Tom’s son Rowland was active in the society, but as a commission merchant in partnership with John Robinson and Peter Ayrault of Charleston, South Carolina, Rowland also moved fluidly in the company of slaveholders.25 In 1793, during his residence in Charleston, Rowland married Mary Peace (1775-1853), the daughter of local merchant Isaac Peace and Elizabeth Gibson, herself the daughter of a Barbadian sugar planter. Family legend had it that Isaac Peace also came to detest slavery and cherished his final years in Bristol, Pennsylvania, rather than Charleston. If Rowland Hazard had both a father and a father-in-law with “great abhorrence and forefaith testimonies against slavery” (according to a family remembrance), he also had a brother Thomas who loathed doing business with slaveholders.26 A New Bedford merchant who shipped spermaceti candles throughout the Atlantic, Thomas found his own fortunes imperiled by the cotton speculation of his too-frequently defaulting customers. “I have no opinion, that a slave holder in a slave country will be governed by the principles of Justice and honor which he must have lost all respect for, long before he could consent to be guilty of so detestable a crime as the holding of his fellow man in slavery,” Thomas wrote to Rowland in 1825.27
The letters Rowland received from his children in these years took a different tone. “I should think the planters require very durable cloths,” twenty-two-year-old Rowland Gibson Hazard advised his father in 1823, adding that “the kind we make of double twisted warp and fulled would suit them very well.” When a business letter missed the traveling Rowland in 1830, his daughter Eliza wrote with a summary of cotton prices and word from New York that “a number of persons buying [textiles] at present from the South.” To be sure, the Hazard children had received Quaker educations in Pennsylvania, their mother Mary remained devout in her practice, and their correspondence expressed pride in Quaker antislavery and an awareness of the global movement toward emancipation. Yet, the generation of Hazards born in the 1790s and early 1800s came of age as “negro cloth” manufacturers, and did so with exuberance. Shortly before he died in 1835, Rowland Hazard heard from son Isaac that production had increased by 20,000 yards over the previous year. The letter indicated that Rowland Gibson Hazard was on an annual selling trip, bringing Rhode Island textiles to planters in Charleston, Savannah, Augusta, Macon, and New Orleans.28

The letters between Rowland Gibson Hazard and Isaac Peace Hazard in the 1820s and 1830s convey the entrepreneurial energy of the early republic United States. “[W]e must introduce our goods by working cheap & gain a reputation for making a good article in which there is no exception,” Isaac wrote to his brother in 1823. As Rowland Gibson Hazard coordinated manufacturing in Rhode Island and Isaac scrambled to locate new customers in the South, information and queries flew back and forth: the best merchant in Natchez, the wool market in Philadelphia, the advantages of being paid in commodities rather than bills of exchange, the ability of cousin Jonathan N. Hazard to produce enough
yarn in Hopkinton, the preferences of planters for mixed wool-cotton blends, the rumor of a Boston company with a coarse cotton fabric that looked like the woolen ozneburgs long used on plantations, the prospect of making jute and wool blankets, and so on. The success of the business was consuming. As sister Mary Hazard would write to her brothers in 1845: “Should there be any human being at Peace Dale not swallowed in an Earthquake, blown away by a Hurricane, or packed into bales of D.H.s or G.P.s [kinds of fabrics] or stretched out to dry during these fine days on the textile bars, this is to inform them that there are also human beings in the goodly town of Newport who would be happy to hold some kind of communication, pursued or rather with the said peoples, and who begin to despair of ever doing so.”

The Hazards rarely discussed their textiles as “negro cloths,” preferring to use the brand names of their fabrics, appellations drawn from the names of southeastern Indian tribes: Choctaw stripes, Chickasaw plains, Creek plaids. Many of their goods were known by the mills that produced them, including Carolina stripes and plaids from a manufactory named after Rowland Gibson Hazard’s wife, not the destination of the textiles. In contrast, their customers were more explicit when they ordered “cotton osnaburgs suitable for field Negroes ware” or asked for prices of “your different Negro goods.” James Alexander Ventress, (later a founding trustee of Ole Miss) had been advised “to purchase negroe cloathing” from the Hazards. “As I shall give my negroes 3 or 4 suits of cloaths per annum, I should like if I can so arrange it with you,” Ventress wrote in 1836. Like many other Southern purchasers, Ventress ordered not just bolts of fabric but rather complete outfits of “shirts and pantaloons for the men + boys and frocks
for the women + girls.” To that end, he included the measurements of his fourteen male slaves and nine female slaves.\textsuperscript{31}

The Hazards received many such orders that shifted their attention to the direct social relations of plantation slavery, even as their Southern customers never used the word “slaves” and instead referred to “servants” or “my peoples.” On a list that included the heights of Noah, Quamina, Elsey, Harriet B., and another ninety enslaved men and women, planter William Dunbar asked that “A bit of paper with the name to be fastened to each suit or dress.” When Thomas Neal ordered one hundred and eighteen jackets for the Quantus Plantation, he explained that men’s sizes had been “taken with no clothes on except the shirt and measured round the breast close under the arms.” The Hazards were not producing clothing for disembodied slaves, but for Demps (5’11” with a 36 inch chest), Dennis Johnston (5’8” with a 37 inch chest), and Gilbert (6’0” with a 42 inch chest).\textsuperscript{32}

The Peace Dale Manufacturing Company conducted most of its sales through Northern merchants, whose euphemistic language nonetheless reminded the Hazards of the nature of their trade. “Have you any new styles Negro goods?” asked a Boston merchant in 1851. “Will you please to send us forthwith, a price list of your Cotton Negro goods,” requested another Northern merchant. Leon Chappotin, the agent of a Cuban planter, had gotten a tip that the Hazards “made clothing up for Negroes at the South.”\textsuperscript{33}

Chappotin’s order confronted the Hazards with another peril of the trade: some of their slaveholding customers were notorious, perhaps none more so than Chappotin’s client, the D’Wolf family of Bristol, Rhode Island. The D’Wolfs figured prominently in the Atlantic slave trade up until—and then well beyond—the 1808 ban. Known for its
illegal slaving voyages, the family also operated the New Hope plantation in Cuba. Sugar and slaves created profits that flowed into D’Wolf coffers through the 1850s. As nineteenth-century Rhode Islanders attempted to hide their state’s centrality in the slave trade, the D’Wolf name caused profound discomfort. An order for one hundred men’s suits and women’s frocks to Cuba in “packages marked Mr. A. D’Wolf” (as Chappotin directed) would certainly have gained the Hazards’s notice.34

The Hazards also filled orders for Isaac Franklin, one of the largest interstate slave traders in the antebellum South. Franklin and his partner John Armfield specialized in transporting the “surplus” slaves of the Chesapeake to New Orleans and Natchez. The firm came to dominate the market through its efficient transport mechanisms (using ships in addition to overland coffles) and its attention to consumer desires. Armfield supplied slaves leaving Virginia with two suits of new clothing to don upon reaching Deep South destinations. “These clothes appeared to be well made, and of good materials; and in the female wardrobe considerable taste was displayed,” observed one visitor to Armfield’s compound, whose reference to female decency might remind readers of how women’s bodies were exposed in the slave market. At the same time, Isaac Franklin and other New Orleans dealers used clothing to, in Walter Johnson’s words, “package” slaves and convey a “window-dressed version of slavery” to eager customers.35

For their apparent indifference, the Hazards were increasingly aware of slavery as a moral problem in American life. Perhaps most important was Rowland Gibson Hazard’s 1841 encounter with a black Rhode Island sailor in New Orleans. For want of documentation, this freeborn man was imprisoned and put to work on a chain gang. Over several months, Hazard and his relative Jacob Barker worked through the New Orleans
courts to free nearly one hundred men of color wrongly imprisoned. In the process, they bore “the imminent risk of mob violence and the extremity of Lynch law,” as Hazard recollected later in life. “[I]t was in this the most earnest effort of my life that the love of justice and hatred of oppression developed and manifested,” he added. The transformative nature of the experience had more bearing on Hazard’s rhetoric than on his line of work. When a New England associate wrote in 1842 to inquire about pursuing an abolition society in the South itself, Hazard expressed doubts that “the cause of humanity would be advanced by [an association] at present,” but followed with an encouraging analogy: “The rain and the dew have a good [deal] to accomplish before they form the river—let each nourish a blade of grass or a flower and the whole landscape will be clothed with beauty.” Hazard wrote these words aboard a steamboat traveling from New Orleans to Vicksburg, perhaps inspired by the scenery, but on his way to sell more textiles to planters.36

The passage of the Fugitive Slave Act in 1850 emboldened Hazard to condemn slavery as a threat to civil liberties. “I am convinced that the slave laws are so repugnant to the moral sentiments and to the religious convictions of this section, that there can be no peace until they are repealed, or suffered by common consent to be a dead letter,” he declared in a speech to the Rhode Island legislature. Bolstering his credentials, Hazard confessed “that I am by descent, by the interests of business and the ties of friendship more closely allied with the South than any other man in this House or perhaps in the State.” Yet as Rowland Gibson Hazard moved into the orbit of the new Republican Party in the mid-1850s, his company continued to dominate the trade in “negro cloth.”37
Isaac Peace Hazard appeared more sympathetic to the slaveholding regime. As Peace Dale’s agent in the South for its initial years, Isaac developed lasting relationships with some of the largest planters in South Carolina and the Black Belt states. The logic and language of paternalism seemed to guide his understanding of both slavery and the production of “negro cloth.” Writing home from Charleston in 1846, for example, Isaac reported that a growing number of planters “wish to give a better looking dress to their negroes than heretofore.” Improved clothing—“better looking, smoother, brighter”—fit within a broader agenda of amelioration, and informants told Isaac that “more and more attention is being yearly paid to the Instruction and clothing of slaves throughout Georgia and S. Carolina.” Correspondence from slaveholders fed the notion that clothing was a moral obligation that bound the powerful to the weak. Matthew N. Brandon of Pickneyville, Louisiana, sought “good Linsey of any colour you please that is good and warm for winter” to outfit enslaved children. “The infants cant ware so coarse and heavy as the grown negroes,” Brandon advised. Other planters complained that the Hazard’s fabric contained too many burrs and not enough substance to last a season or provide necessary warmth. “The extreme severe weather of this last week admonished me that my people might suffer for the want of their winter clothing,” wrote Thomas Aston Coffin in 1844, using the language of paternalism in pursuit of a late delivery. Coffin remained a loyal, but unsatisfied customer. “I have not seen the Cloth sent by you,” he lamented in 1850, “but hope it is much better than that of last season.” Coffin “fear[ed] the negroes will not feel satisfied to return to it,” although it is impossible to determine Coffin’s actual investment in the satisfaction of his slaves, his anxiety regarding dissatisfied slaves, or his skill in manipulating the presumed moral sensibilities of his supplier.
If would-be abolitionists wrote to Rowland Gibson Hazard, proslavery ideologues sent chilling letters to Isaac, with whom they perceived a shared politics. “I think the time is not far distant when the South must manufacture for itself and cease to be dependent on those who take our money and then bestow on us every epithet which their malignant ingenuity can command in the way of vituperation and opprobrium,” wrote Dr. R.W. Walker from Port Hudson, Louisiana, in 1842. “Of course I do not allude to you or any member of your firm,” he added. As he explained his willingness to pay higher prices rather than embolden “the cutthroat fanatics of the North,” Walker even cast doubt on the value of the Union. He was particularly irritated by his recent mail: “I have been favored lately with a few numbers of the ‘Spirit of Liberty’ ‘Philanthropist’ & an ‘Abolitionist Almanac’ sent to me from Ohio by some unknown Darky.” Noting the Cedar of Lebanon emblem belonging to one of the abolitionist societies, Walker observed “from a portrait of that tree that it has pretty strong horizontal branches near the earth—These with the hemp of Kentucky may answer a useful purpose on a coming day.”

Letters from the advocates of abolition and slavery alike reminded the Hazards that their business existed in a charged political context. Already in the mid-1830s, Southern politicians were advocating boycotts of Northern textiles to protest the growing abolition movement. By the 1850s, Southern nationalists (especially those supporting industrial development in the region) denounced “those trashy Northern goods that annually flood our markets.” E. Steadman, who operated a Tennessee textile manufactory, recalled his outrage upon reading a newspaper account of a Stonington, Connecticut, rally in support of the Republican Party’s 1856 presidential campaign, and
then walking outside to see “slaves clothed in plaids, manufactured at Stonington,” the port from which the Hazards shipped most of their goods.  

Alternatively, abolitionists like Henry Stanton and Theodore Weld reminded Rhode Island audiences of the state’s ignominious role in the Atlantic slave trade and then indicted the state’s textile industry as “the most profitable customer of the South in her great staple of cotton.” In an 1836 letter, Weld argued that Rhode Island “deputi[zed] the master, as her agent, to plunder the slave of his all, and then, by inviting him to her market with his spoils, to receive the wages of his iniquity, she bribes him to plunder again.” Organized anti-abolitionism flourished in mid-1830s Rhode Island, as meetings called by leading manufacturers passed resolutions denouncing abolitionism as “dangerous to the existing relations of friendship and of business between different sections of our country.” Joseph Peace Hazard, younger brother of Isaac and Rowland Gibson Hazard, reportedly collected more signatures on an 1835 anti-abolitionist petition than anyone else in Rhode Island.  

Ultimately, the Hazards spent less time ruminating on national politics than running a business. If they were able to compartmentalize manufacturing “negro cloth” from moral considerations, the day-to-day exigencies of managing their accounts made it impossible to avoid confronting slavery. Many of their Southern customers paid in bales of cotton, and as their Carolina Mills came to consume 1,600 lbs. each day, the Hazards had as much stake in the price of cotton as any planter. When cotton prices fell too far, however, new textile orders dried up. “Cotton is too low, money too scarce, & exchange too high to afford to purchase any more clothing of you for my negros,” explained one of many planters in the wake of the Panic of 1837.  

Insofar as their business was largely
conducted on credit, the Hazards waited for customers to make payments typically eight months down the road.\textsuperscript{44} Not surprisingly, they eagerly gathered intelligence on the state of the cotton crop that would determine whether the firm received payment. The inability of Southern customers to pay placed the Hazards in a particular predicament. “I carried ten slaves to N. Orleans which I left there to be sold,” reported J.C. Evens, an indebted customer from Mobile who wanted to demonstrate a good-faith effort to cover his bills. This was certainly more information than the Hazards wanted, and perhaps a subtle message to the Rhode Islanders to back off. Did they \textit{really} want to bear responsibility for slave sales?\textsuperscript{45} Once that possibility entered the discussion, collecting overdue payments from Southern planters became the most morally fraught aspect of making clothing for slaves.

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“You have no idea of the perplexities and the fatigue I have had to go through since I have been in this country,” wrote Bennett Upson in 1842 from Natchez to his wife back home in New England. Upson was the collection agent of a Connecticut cotton gin manufacturer, and his lament was typical of those traversing Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Arkansas, and Texas in search of the money owed to Northern makers of plantation goods. “The Situation of the country at this time is truly distressing with a Depreciated currency and the Planters nearly all Bankrupt,” Upson explained, offering “no apology for the general tenor of my Letter Penmanship &c. for it is written in a Hurry and under the Influence of H\_A\_R\_D T\_I\_M\_E\_S.” As his odyssey stretched from
months into years, Upson asked his lonely wife to endure his absence as a necessary
sacrifice to benefit the family they hoped to start. “I have Been expecting to have been
home long before this,” he wrote the increasingly forlorn Ursula, “but the unforeseen
Disappointments occasioned by the Depressed state of the country has proved itself a
barrier calculated to obstruct the progress and Disappoint all persons of a Business
Capacity in the South.”  

As a genre of travel writing, the correspondence of Northern collection agents
recounted the difficulties of getting planters to pay. “[Y]ou must not push too hard, and
they will not give you the opportunity to snap them here; consequently, You must coax,
and flatter, and tease, and dog them down,” explained Levi Beebe from New Orleans in
1821. The pace of Southern business culture seemed alarmingly slow to Northern firms,
even those used to extending merchandise on credit of eight months or more. As one
South Carolina jurist confirmed, “The habits of society are not distinguished by such
punctuality in the payment of debts, or such rigor in enforcing the rights of creditors.”
Entering the South’s commodity-export economy, Northern businesses were paid on
cotton’s schedule, not their own. A pestered Mississippi planter gave Rowland Gibson
Hazard an earful, declaring himself “astonished that a Yankee of your astuteness should
be surprised at the shortcoming of his customers with a short crop!” In turn, Hazard
found himself further irritated that payment hinged upon not merely a successful cotton
harvest, but the marketing of that crop, and the eventual arrival of bills of exchange and
specie from English purchasers. Great delays ensued, “owing to the unwillingness of
Factors to pay for the Planters unless the cash is actually in hand.” With everything riding
on cotton, the Hazards bore other risks as well. Thomas Aston Coffin wrote from
Charleston in 1850 to relate “the cause of my delay in settling for the last year cloth you
sent on the burning up of my two crops of cotton in market uninsured last April.”

The problem of currency in the aftermath of the Panic of 1837—an economic
depression that did not reach its nadir in the South until 1842—was perhaps the greatest
obstacle to quick payment. “Planters are so destitute of cash that many would disappoint
us in payments until another year,” reported the firm responsible for marketing the
Hazards’ “negro cloth” in Savannah. “I have a good stock of goods on hand as would
demand money if their was any in circulation,” noted Lester Hotchkiss, a dry goods
merchant in New Sabine, Texas. “We labor under many difficulties in making
collections, which you at the North are not aware of,” explained an Alabama merchant in
search of three extra months on an overdue note to a Connecticut supplier of hats.

What money did circulate was notoriously unreliable in what one Texan writer
called “these Loco Times” following the dissolution of the Second Bank of the United
States. Finding “good money” in the South that would be recognized by a Northern bank
hamstrung Bennett Upson who had accumulated nearly $1,000 for his Connecticut
employer, but “cannot get it in any shape to send it to them.” Upson received many notes
that were protested when he attempted to redeem them in Mobile, and his efforts to
purchase bills that would pass muster in the North stalled in the face of a debilitating
exchange rate. “[W]hat money you get is worth but little,” Upson wrote home from
Alabama in 1842, and “Exchange between this state and New York is from 20 to 25 & 30
percent Disc[ounted].” It is in this context that one can understand the enthusiasm of Dr.
Samuel P. Reed of Beaufort, South Carolina, when he settled his account with the
Hazards that same year: “I am in funds, a most extraordinary and unprecedented state to
be in during these ‘Hard Times’; when money seems to have rendered itself back to its pristine state in the bowels of the earth; for the sights of twenty dollars at a single glance are as rare, few and far-between as the visits of the Angels (not meaning any disrespect to the last-mentioned beings).” For his part, Rowland Gibson Hazard condemned “fluctuating currency as a very serious evil” and “a species of gambling,” but nonetheless saw being paid in depreciated notes as better than not being paid at all.49

Before, during, and after the Panic, however, many Southern purchasers failed to meet to their bills, which prompted Northern firms and their collection agents to seek legal redress. David Marvin set out for the South to collect the bills due his shoemaking firm in 1851. “Go direct route to New Orleans stopping at places along the River where we have got delinquents and dun them up,” advised his brother Walt from the company’s store on Courtland Street in New York City. Marvin carried a small notebook containing the firm’s accounts and notes that Walt provided on each delinquent customer: “[W]e want these men to pay up— If they cannot do it immediately sue them or take some other same method of collecting from them what they owe us,” read the entry for a storekeeper in Pine Bluff, Texas. “[I]t is best to sue them,” suggested Walt in regard to another Texas customer. If Benjamin Screws of Glenville, Alabama did not pay, “we had better sue him.” As he traveled the South over the next year, Marvin did not find himself in court, but maintained a list of the best lawyers in each town, should legal action become necessary. Lawsuits only made sense if the person being sued had property, so Marvin gathered intelligence, learning for example that “it will not do good to sue [Robert M. Hannay of Rock Island, Texas] as his property is in other names.” In this case, “the best way is to be easy on Hannay…. we had better coax him along.” Somewhere along the
way, Marvin received a tip that he also duly recorded: “Negroes are good property to attach.”

This advice made good sense, for slaves were the most liquid form of property in the antebellum South. In most states, the law made it more difficult for creditors to seize and sell farms or house-lots. During tough times, the value of such property could decline precipitously, and sheriffs’ auctions might generate only minimal revenue, perhaps not enough to cover the initial debt, if no one in the immediate vicinity was poised to bid. In contrast, the bodies of enslaved men, women, and children could be sold with minimal legal entanglements, regardless of whether a particular state classified slave property as real or personal, moveable or immovable, and actionable in chancery or law courts. More importantly, the prices of slaves seemed only to rise. Whereas land prices were determined locally, the prices of slaves were set in a far broader market stretching from Baltimore to New Orleans to St. Louis. “[T]imes are worse than was ever before known [,] there is no Money in the Country, and no person pretends to pay Debts,” observed Bennett Upson in 1840, “But likely Negro fellows will bring 1600 dollars on a credit of 12 months, with good security.” Rowland Gibson Hazard received similar information from a former Rhode Islander who had relocated to Mississippi: “You know that negroes are the last ‘property’ that will fall [in price] & the last that planters will part with.”

Not surprisingly, Northern firms kept careful tabs on the enslaved property of their Southern customers. The pioneer in credit reporting, Lewis Tappen’s Mercantile Agency (and later R.G. Dun & Co.) recorded the ages and conditions of slaves owned by Southern businessmen. The purchaser of this information—a New York clothing manufacturer, for example—could then make a reasoned decision about how much
merchandise to send a new customer from Mobile, on what terms, and with what recourse for recovery.\textsuperscript{52} Similar information was gathered in the field by the likes of David Marvin and Bennett Upson. From his brother-in-law in Texas, Upson learned that an overdue customer had failed to raise the needed $150 from his last cotton crop, but “has a Negro Woman he wants to sell and when you come out he will make some arrangement to pay that debt he says.” Consider Marvin’s notes on a Texas businessman: Tyron “is said by some to be a rascal [;] others say he is a very honest man and has considerable property said to own forty negroes which some say is not comatable as they are in his wifes name.” Marvin’s neologism \textit{come-at-able} captured the basic logic of the collections game, but his entry revealed one of the several ways that Southerners protected their enslaved property.\textsuperscript{53}

In many Southern states, debtors also had the prerogative to name preferred creditors who would be paid off before others. In rural economies where most adult white men were connected through debt, and in which family members served as creditors and sureties for one another, outsiders could be easily put off. The Hazards devoted a great deal of energy to recouping a $7,000 debt (more than six years overdue) from William Barnwell of Beaufort, South Carolina. To protect himself in 1847, Barnwell placed his assets in the hands of “a few confidential creditors,” local allies and relatives who would make sure that his property was not “sold in a hurry” to meet the demands of the dozens of other creditors like the Hazards. “What is usually called Property with us was all mortgaged already to my Relations and Friends for Debts + Securities &c.,” explained Barnwell, asking the Hazards “to be indulgent and to wait a little while,” but making clear that his slaves were untouchable. The Hazards were furious, not because they were
eager to initiate a slave sale (what Rowland presumably described as “a very unpleasant aspect” of the business), but because it was inconceivable that an insolvent debtor should be able to escape the moral obligations of debt. The Hazards immediately contacted Charleston acquaintances for advice on how to check Barnwell’s maneuvering. One correspondent heard from the tax collector in Beaufort that Barnwell was “fully sufficient to pay every liability.” Another “consider[ed] the chances of recovering any thing as almost desperate.” Ultimately, Barnwell’s strategy succeeded, and the Hazards received only a fraction of the original debt. In the future, however, the Hazards made better use of the courts to seize the property of defaulting customers.\textsuperscript{54}

The plantation provisioning trade was presumably competitive enough, with numerous enterprises seeking to furnish planters with hoes, shoes, and blankets, that no Northern firm could force Southern customers into signing mortgages or other formal instruments to insure prompt repayment. The best bet was to conduct business with the largest planters, particularly those whose factors were flush with cash.\textsuperscript{55} But in most cases, Northern firms had to pursue small debts from customers lacking substantial financial backing from large factorage agencies or banks in New Orleans and other commercial centers. Daniel and Hezekiah Scovil of Higganum, Connecticut, sold their “planter’s hoe”—“the best article in the market,” they boasted—on terms of six months credit and with a 5 percent discount for payment in cash. Checks drawn on New York banks were “the usual method of remittance from the South,” they informed the dry goods merchants in such places as Milledgeville, Macon, and Apalachicola who comprised the bulk of their customers. When they were not sending promotional mailings to Southern storekeepers, the Scovils devoted their energies to tracking down debts of $40 and $50.\textsuperscript{56}
Although the evidence indicates that the Scovils preferred to write letters than to file debt suits, the system of mercantile credit that linked Northern businesses to Southern consumers gave Northerners a property interest in slavery. Slaves did not have to be collateralized in formal mortgages to provide a degree of credit-worthiness to their owners. A capitalized labor force did not merely provide low-cost labor, but stored wealth that could readily be converted to cash; thus, slaves served as the basis of local, regional, and national networks of credit. Recent studies of slave sales have drawn out this point, noting the preponderance of transactions initiated under the operation of law, usually on the courthouse steps and usually occasioned by foreclosures on debts. The courts might be considered, in the words of legal scholar Thomas Russell, “South Carolina’s largest slave auctioning firm.” In this light, an owner’s property interest in a slave was never the absolute claimed by many Southern jurists (following Blackstone). Instead, slave property constituted “a fragmented form” in which numerous parties held an interest. If the law tends to define property as a “bundle of rights,” then every Northern creditor of a slaveholder possessed rights within that bundle. In Russell’s conceptualization of slave property, then, Northern businesses entered the slave market with every sale of hoes, shirts, and shovels on terms of credit.57

This possibility was not lost on contemporary commentators. It proved particularly useful to Southern propagandists responding to the publication of Uncle Tom’s Cabin in 1852. Tapping into a sentimental culture that deemed family separations the gravest evil of slavery, Harriet Beecher Stowe had discredited the paternalistic pretensions of slaveholders who sold children away from mothers, wives from husbands, and siblings from one another. To that end, if the forces initiating sales could be located
outside the planter’s own control, then it might be possible to continue to depict slavery as a benevolent system. Accordingly, when the plotlines of the so-called Anti-Tom novels of the 1850s arrived at a slave sale, a Northern businessman was sure to be close by. In Charles Jacob Peterson’s *The Cabin and Parlor* (1852), for example, “Messrs. Skin and Flint, factors and merchants of New York” bore responsibility for a sale, and thereby corrupted an institution that purportedly insulated families from the vagaries of the marketplace.58

Although the abolitionist movement did not devote much attention to the manufacturing of plantation goods, an occasional essayist revealed “the intimate connection and direct participation of northern merchants and manufacturers with slave-holders.” When Northern businesses sold goods on credit and accepted slaves as security, sales would certainly follow in order to settle overdue accounts; one polemicist called this “Slave Trading in Massachusetts.” Advocates of “free produce” claimed no surprise at their difficulty in gaining adherents when so many Northerners were “implicated in the system” through trade. One Quaker confessed that his business with the South “sometimes led to the necessity of placing his claims in the hand of an attorney for collection; to accomplish which he had no doubt that slaves were sold, as they were a species of property most convenient for seizure under an execution.” Abolitionists did claim to see justice when economic difficulties in the South reverberated to the financial ruin of Northern businesses. No case brought more satisfaction than the bankruptcy of three Newark, New Jersey, wholesale whip manufacturers whose Southern customers had defaulted in the Panic of 1837.59
In February 1849, Peter C. Bacon introduced a bill to the Massachusetts House of Representatives declaring “null and void all contracts, the consideration thereof shall be the sale or transfer of slaves.” Whereas other legislators regularly brought antislavery petitions to the floor on behalf of their abolitionist constituents, Bacon’s bill appeared of his own hand. A Worcester lawyer, Bacon represented some of the largest cotton textile firms in the Blackstone Valley, including Samuel Slater & Sons. While Bacon’s business ledgers do not reveal his involvement in a specific suit that might have resulted in slave sales, such cases were perhaps inevitable in the course of a practice whose clients were the leading businessmen of the manufacturing corridor between Providence and central Massachusetts. Bacon’s bill was referred to the Judiciary Committee, which declared it “inexpedient to legislate” after several months of delay.60

The extent to which Northern firms owned slaves by virtue of their credit relations with Southern customers is a topic for additional investigation. Two recent studies suggest this was a common occurrence. Richard Kilbourne has investigated the collapse of Nicholas Biddle’s United States Bank of Pennsylvania (the successor to the de-funded Second B.U.S.). At that time of its 1841 failure, over $6 million of the bank’s assets were on loan in Mississippi, a result of Biddle’s contention that plantation agriculture offered the surest means of acquiring specie for the American economy. By virtue of this investment strategy, the Pennsylvania trustees who were charged to recover the assets of the failed bank found themselves owning hundreds of slaves and reaping returns from four plantations. Philadelphia-born Joseph L. Roberts managed the affairs on the ground in Mississippi, buying slaves for himself, hiring overseers to run the plantations in the bank’s possession, and demanding the bank’s debtors secure older
loans with new slave mortgages. Tellingly, Roberts conspired to keep the bank’s primary trustee in Philadelphia completely in the dark on these matters.61

Daniel Hamilton’s study of property confiscation during the Civil War offers an even broader glimpse of interregional commerce. In August 1861, the Confederacy passed a Sequestration Act in order to seize the assets of aliens and enemies. Lands and personal property owned by Northerners became property of the Confederacy, but so too did the debts owed to Northern firms. A storekeeper who owed $50 to a Northern wholesaler now owed $50 to the C.S.A., which appointed commissioners to collect such debts with an unprecedented urgency in order to fund the war. As the legality of Sequestration was sustained in court, its enforcement proved oppressive to many and diminished public support for the Confederate cause. Nonetheless, the law generated an astonishing paper trail of Northern property interests in the South. After its victory in the war, the United States declared that no laws of the Confederacy had ever carried legal weight. As a result, Southerners who had discharged their Northern debts to the C.S.A. would have to pay again after 1865.62

*   *   *   *   *   *   *

Commerce in plantation goods was extensive in scope and politicized in its nature. A company might claim to exist solely to manufacture hoes, but so long as slavery constituted a moral problem in American life, the production of agricultural implements and clothing for slaves would necessarily entail ethical considerations. Northern firms had no monopoly on such concerns, and Southern advocates of
manufacturing could cast “home production” as an imperative equal to the call for “clean hands” by Northern abolitionists. Still, the tension between the North’s purported opposition to slavery and its deep investment in the institution draws particular attention to the manufacturers of shoes, shovels, and shirts for slaves. Consider the story of Charles Blair, a blacksmith at the Collins Manufacturing Company of Collinsville, Connecticut.

In 1860, when the Collins Company was already among the largest producers of machetes for use on sugar plantations, Blair was called to Washington to appear before a Senate committee. The topic was not a sugar tariff or legislation to promote American manufacturing, but rather an investigation into John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry. Blair had shipped nearly 1,000 pikes to Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in the summer of 1859. Although Blair’s machetes and pikes were both very sharp, they augured different outcomes for the slaves who were intended to use them. Would it be possible for Blair to describe himself simply as “engaged in edge-tool making?”

Northern manufacturers of plantations goods asserted a business ethics even when they denied any particular moral consequence to provisioning Southern slavery. In most cases, the prompt payment of a debt and honest brokering constituted a greater moral concern than one’s relationship to the slave system. Nonetheless, manufacturing slave brogans could never be the same as manufacturing an abstract, indistinct commodity like widgets (in the parlance of Econ 101), as illustrated in an exchange between a Southern planter and his Massachusetts provider of slave shoes on the eve of the 1860 Presidential election. The planter implied that a vote for Lincoln would end their business relationship, but the manufacturer replied, “I sell boots not principles.” The customer was welcome to take his money elsewhere, “but not under any consideration will I sell my
principles to sell boots.” By this logic, the destination of the manufacturer’s boots was not a question of principle. Over the course of the nineteenth century, however, this was an increasingly unsupportable contention, a position made impossible by the operation of a legal system that linked credit to slave selling, a popular culture that politicized commodity exchange of every sort, and an electoral politics that inspired a planter to boycott a shoemaker who intended to vote for Lincoln.

1 Hampshire Gazette, Northampton, Mass., July 1, 1856 (Fremont rally); July 8, 1856 (account of Deming firing). On the production of “planters hoes,” see Bay State Tool Manufacturing Company to O. Ames & Sons, December 27 and 31, 1856, Ames Shovel Company, F219, Incoming Correspondence, 1856, Arnold B. Tofias Industrial Archives, Stonehill College [hereafter Tofias].

2 Hampshire Gazette, July 8, 1856 (circular); Jonathan Bailey to O. Ames & Sons, July 12, 1856, Tofias. On Oliver and Oakes Ames, see Gregory J. Galer, Forging Ahead: The Ames Family of Easton, Massachusetts and Two Centuries of Industrial Enterprise, 1635-1861 (North Easton, Mass.: Stonehill Industrial History Center, 2002).


4 On business ethics within Anglo-American efforts to end the trans-Atlantic slave trade, see Philip Gould, Barbaric Traffic: Commerce and Antislavery in the Eighteenth-Century Atlantic World (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2003), ch. 1; Christopher L. Brown, Moral Capital: Foundations of British Abolitionism (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina/OIEAHC, 2006). On the broader relationship of capitalism and antislavery, see Thomas Bender, ed., The Antislavery Debate: Capitalism and Abolitionism as a Problem in Historical Interpretation (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1992). From that exchange, many scholars have found use in Thomas Haskell’s contention that long-distance commercial exchange fostered a new sensibility that allowed Europeans to see themselves as capable of effecting wide-reaching social reform. Although these reform efforts reached their pinnacle in mid-nineteenth-century, the national economy of cotton and plantation goods that linked North and South likely
invested far more Americans in slavery than in its abolition. For a recent discussion of Quaker businessmen and the moral problem of slavery, see A. Glenn Crothers, “Quaker Merchants and Slavery in Early National Alexandria, Virginia: The Ordeal of William Hartshorne,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 25 (Spring 2005): 47-78.

5 On marketing to the South, see the advertisement for New York’s Treadwill and Jones National Agricultural and Seed Warehouse in *Southern Cultivator* [Augusta, Ga.], February 1859. On “clean hands,” see Carol Faulkner, “The Root of Evil: Free Produce and Radical Antislavery, 1820-1860,” *Journal of the Early Republic* 27 (fall 2007): 377-405. Supporters of the Free Produce movement compared the consumers of slave-grown sugar with the manufacturers of slave manacles and thumb-screws, but the manufacturers of plantation goods eluded their attention. See “Right Action,” *Non-Slaveholder* [Philadelphia], New Series, 2: (Fifth Month, 1854). On the lumberman and the distiller, see *Non-Slaveholder* 4 (Second Month, 1849).


18 Snell, Discourse, 16-17. On the schism, see, Jeffrey H. Fiske, History of the North Brookfield Congregational Church: Serving Christ for 250 Years (North Brookfield, Mass.: North Brookfield Congregational Church, 2005), 77-99

19 Scholars have described “negrō cloth” as a tool of social differentiation, making much of a Charleston, South Carolina, grand jury’s 1822 pronouncement that “Every distinction should be created between the white and the negroes, calculated to make the latter feel the superiority of the former.” The report drew specific attention to clothing: “Negroes should be permitted to dress only in coarse stuffs such as coarse woolens or worsted stuffs for winter—and coarse cotton stuffs for summer.” See Stachiw, “Sake of Commerce,” 35. However, to my knowledge, no states or municipalities passed or enforced sumptuary laws for slaves in the nineteenth-century South. Based on fabric samples found in the records of the Peace Dale Manufacturing Company, as well as on the wide range of orders that arrived from Southern planters, most, but not all, “negrō cloth” was scratchy or rough to the touch; some cotton plaids were fairly smooth. To that end, “negrō cloth” may be defined less by its universal “coarseness” than by the fact that it was intended for slaves. Depending on who was to wear them, cassinetts, ozneburgs, satinetts, kerseys, and linsey-wooleys could be classified as “negrō cloth.” On basic production, see Robert B. Gordon and Patrick M. Malone, The Texture of Industry: An Archaeological View of the Industrialization of North America (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 248-249. For terminology, see Florence M. Montgomery, Textiles in America, 1650-1870… (New York: W.W. Norton, 1984). The Peace Dale Manufacturing Company records are housed in the Historical Collections, Baker Library, Harvard Business School [hereafter PDMC].


21 Rowland G. Hazard to Michael Nisbet, August 29, 1829, PDMC, Vol. VI-1, Case 12, folder 2. For the passing of ownership from father to sons, see Rowland G. Hazard to Rowland Hazard, May 30, 1829, Nathaniel Terry Bacon Papers, Series II: Rowland Hazard, box 98, folder 9,

22 Thomas Edmondson to Dover Younghusband & Co., November 6, 1806, Edmondson Letterbook, ms. 317, Maryland Historical Society Library.


25 During his years as a merchant in Atlantic commerce, Rowland had the opportunity to offer a lesson in business ethics to a Philadelphia associate who had sold a shipment of molasses for a price below an established baseline: “in a consignee we repose a trust of the highest nature at their disposal we place our fortunes and the welfare of our families, but in this case thou hast not discovered a sentiment of friendship or honor nor has thy thy ties of moral obligation bound thee for had thou felt a sense of either a retrospective view of this business would have put thee to the [missing word] & instead of protesting my bill under the false [missing] of its overrunning the ballance in thy hand thirty days and by that means disgracing my bill greatly to my injury an act that discovers the greatest depravity of principle & to be detested by all good men. I will further observe to thee that when I mentioned the loss we had sustained by thy selling our Molasses in the way thou did, at New Port, thou treated it with lightness & turned off with a sneer which further shews how little thou regards that principle, do unto others as thou would be done by.” Rowland Hazard to James Robinson Jr., August 20, 1798, NTBP, box 99, folder 4.

26 On the antislavery sentiment of both “College Tom” Hazard and Isaac Peace, see the undated fragmentary family history penned by Elizabeth Hazard, the sister of Rowland Gibson Hazard, Isaac P. Hazard, and Joseph P. Hazard, NTBP, box 99, folder 12. According to an 1890 memorandum written by Joseph P. Hazard (then eighty-three years old), Isaac Peace terminated a business partnership with John Wakefield of Kendal, Cumbria, England, upon learning that Wakefield had provided shackles for a slaving voyage. According to the aforementioned history offered by Elizabeth Hazard, Wakefield was no mere business associate, but had sheltered Peace’s wife, daughter, and son during the American Revolution. See NTBP, Series III: Joseph Peace Hazard, November 30, 1890 memorandum, box 104, folder 13. For additional Hazard family history, see Oba, “Mostly Made,” 27; Caroline Hazard, Thomas Hazard, son of Robt call’d College Tom. A Study of Life in Narragansett in the XVIIIth Century, by his Grandson’s Granddaughter, Caroline Hazard (Boston: Houghton Mifflin & Co., 1893); Letters of Rowland Gibson Hazard with a Biographical Sketch by Caroline Hazard and Two Appreciations (Boston: Merrymount Press, 1922).

27 Thomas Hazard Jr. to Rowland Hazard, September 24 (quote), October 28 1825, NTBP, box 98, folder 8. See also Thomas Hazard Jr. Letter Book, 1811-1816, Miscellaneous Manuscripts Collection, Manuscripts and Archives, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University. Thomas’ son-in-law was Jacob Barker, a controversial New York merchant who reinvented himself in New

28 R.G. Hazard to Rowland Hazard, January 27, 1823, NTBP, box 98, folder 6; Eliza Hazard to Rowland Hazard, August 28, 1830, NTBP, box 98, folder 10; Mary Peace Hazard to Rowland Hazard, June 10, 1815, NTBP, box 98, folder 3; Eliza Hazard to I.P. Hazard and J.P. Hazard, May 20, 1816, NTBP, box 98, folder 4 (reference to Thomas Clarkson); Caroline Hazard (Rowland’s wife) to Eliza Hazard and Mary Hazard, January 23, 1831, NTBP, box 98, folder 14 (reference to Jamaican slave insurrection in 1831); R.G. Hazard to I.P. Hazard, December 24, 1827, PDMC, Vol. VI-1, Case 12, folder 2 (“mother & Joseph have just gone to monthly meeting”); Jacob Barker to Rowland Hazard, May 27, 1828, NTBP, box 98, folder 10 (report on Yearly Meeting in New York); I.P. Hazard to Rowland Hazard, January --, 1835, NTBP, box 98, folder 13.

29 I.P. Hazard to R.G. Hazard, December 3, 1823, Rowland G. and Caroline Hazard Papers, ms. 483, sg 5, box 1, folder 2, Rhode Island Historical Society [hereafter RGCHP]. For a concentration of letters between the brothers, see RGCHP and PDMC, Vol. VI-1, Case 12, folder 2. Mary P. Hazard to I.P. Hazard, March --, 1845, PDMC, Vol. VI-1, Case 12, folder 6.

30 Rowland Gibson’s original Peace Dale factory was named after his wife, Mary Peace. On the line of Hazard textiles, see Ralph Kellogg to R.G. Hazard, May 10, 1851, PDMC, Vol. VIII-1, Case 25, folder 4; Spring, Bradley, & Buffum to R.G. Hazard, October 25, 1854, PDMC, Vol. VII-1, Case 23, folder 1. Smithfield, Rhode Island, was home to a Georgia Manufacturing Company, potentially for the destination of its coarse fabrics. Jonathan Hazard, a cousin and manufacturer in Hopkinton, R.I., used the term “negro cloths” in his correspondence with Rowland Gibson Hazard. See Jonathan N. Hazard to R.G. Hazard, February 17, 25, November 24, 1828, PDMC, Vol. VI-1, Case 12, folder 1. The only instance I have found of Rowland Gibson Hazard using the term “negro shirtings” is R.G. Hazard to I.P. Hazard, January 1, 1828, PDMC, Vol. VI-1, Case 12, folder 2.


32 Polaski Cage to R.G. Hazard, February 15, 1836, PDMC, Vol. V-1, Case 7, folder 7a; W. Dunbar order, 1838, PDMC, Vol. I-1, Case 1, folder 15; Thomas Neal order, undated, PDMC, Vol. V-1, Case 7, folder 7a. These data may have consequences for the anthropometric study of slave health, a possibility I am currently exploring.


Light & Stearns, 1836), 140; Walter Johnson, Soul by Soul: Life inside the Antebellum Slave Market (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1999), 120-121.


39 Dr. R.W. Walker to I.P. Hazard, April 22, 1842, PDMC, Vol. VI-1, Case 12, folder 5.

40 On Southern boycotts, see “Late from the South—Non-Intercourse,” Newport [R.I.] Mercury, September 19, 1835, as quoted in Oba, “Mostly Made,” 47; O’Connor, Lords of the Loom, 46. Farmer & Planter [Columbia, South Carolina], May 1859, back cover advertisement; E. Steadman, The Southern Manufacturer: Showing the Advantage of Manufacturing the Cotton in the Fields where it is Grown; Compared with its Manufacture in the Eastern States... (Gallatin, Tenn.: Gray & Boyers, 1858), 18.


44 “A few days ago the case of Negro Goods forwarded for us 8 Oct., came to hand, & agreeable to your request, we now send you a note for the amount at 8 months from date of invoice.” P. & R. Bryce (Columbia, SC) to R.G. Hazard, November 3, 1846, PDMC, Vol. VI-1, Case 12,
For same terms, see Ravenel & Huger (Charleston, SC) to R.G. Hazard, December 23, 1853, PDMC, Vol. VI-1, Case 12, folder 10.

45 Thomas Lesesne (Mobile, Ala.) to Rowland Gibson Hazard (Peace Dale, RI), April 9, 1842, PDMC, Volume VI-1, General Letters, Case 12, folder 5.

46 Bennett Upson to Ursula Upson, May 27, 1842, May 9, 1839, June 14, 1840, Bennett Upson Papers, ms. 679, box 1, Manuscripts and Archives, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University [hereafter BUP].


48 W. King to I.P. Hazard, September 16, 1842, IPHBP; Lester Hotchkiss to Bennett Upson, September 9, 1840, BUP; James Brazer & Co. to F.S. Wildman, October 21, 1842, Wildman Family Papers, ms. 1029, box 1, folder 10, Manuscripts and Archives, Sterling Memorial Library, Yale University.


I thank Ed Balleisen for the point about the competitiveness of the market precluding the use of formal debt instruments. On factors and prompt payments, see Kilbourne, *Debt, Investment, Slaves*, page.

D. &. H. Scovil to Wiley & McKinzie, November 11, 1847, Scovil Hoe Correspondence, 1844-1850, Outgoing Letterbook, Philip Porter Collection, Haddam (Ct.) Historical Society.


Massachusetts Archives, Series SC1 532, House Journal, 1722-2002, p. 185; Peter C. Bacon Papers, Manuscripts Collection, American Antiquarian Society, Worcester, Mass. During the same session of the Massachusetts House of Representatives in 1849, Mr. Greene of Milton introduced a petition from Ellis Gray Loring that called for a law to ban “the Employment of Massachusetts shipping and Massachusetts capital in the domestic slave trade.” The Judiciary Committee declared it also “inexpedient to legislate.”

